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FOREWORD 
Unders tand ing  t h e  n a t u r e  and d imens ions o f  t h e  w o r l d  food  
p o p u l a t i o n  and t h e  p o l i c i e s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  a l l e v i a t e  i t  has 
been t h e  f o c a l  p o i n t  o f  t h e  I IASA Food and A g r i c u l t u r e  
Program s i n c e  i t  began i n  1977. 
N a t i o n a l  food systems a r e  h i g h l y  i n te rdependen t ,  and y e t  
t h e  major  p o l i c y  o p t i o n s  e x i s t  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  
Therefore,  t o  e x p l o r e  t h e s e  op t i ons ,  i t  i s  necessary  b o t h  
t o  deve lop  p o l i c y  models f o r  n a t i o n a l  economies and t o  
L ink  them t o g e t h e r  by  t r a d e  and c a p i t a l  t r a n s f e r s .  For 
g r e a t e r  r e a l i s m  t h e  models i n  t h i s  scheme a r e  b e i n g  kep t  
d e s c r i p t i v e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  no rmat i ve .  I n  t h e  end i t  i s  
p roposed t o  L ink  models o f  some t w e n t y  c o u n t r i e s ,  wh ich  
t o g e t h e r  account  f o r  n e a r l y  80 p e r c e n t  o f  i m p o r t a n t  a g r i -  
c u l t u r a l  a t t r i b u t e s  such as area, p roduc t i on ,  p o p u l a t i o n ,  
expor ts ,  i m p o r t s  and so on. 
I n  such a  system o f  L inked  models, i t  i s  u s e f u l  t o  endogenize 
government p o l i c i e s .  I f  p o l i c i e s  o f  a l l  n a t i o n a l  governments 
a r e  s p e c i f i e d  exogenously, t h e  number o f  exogenous p o l i c y  
parameters  wou ld  be v e r y  Large. Not o n l y  q u e s t i o n s  on t h e  
c o n s i s t e n c y  of t h e  s p e c i f i e d  pa ramete rs  a r i s e ,  b u t  a l s o  t h e  
number o f  s c e n a r i o s  needed f o r  a n a l y s i s  would be s u b s t a n t i a l .  
For t h e s e  reasons, development of  a  p o l i c y  module has been 
cons ide red  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  t h e  FAP's B a s i c  L i n k e d  System of  
n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  models. Gera ld  Rober tson and Bruce Huff 
have d e s c r i b e d  he re  t h e i r  work on t h e  p o l i c y  b l o c k  o f  t h e  
d e t a i l e d  Canadian a g r i c u l t u r a l  p o l i c y  model b e i n g  deve loped 
i n  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  w i t h  A g r i c u l t u r e  Canada. 
K i r i t  S. P a r i k h  
Program Leader 
Food and A g r i  c u l t u r e  Program 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 O b j e c t i v e s  and S c o ~ e  
The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  A p p l i e d  Systems A n a l y s i s  
( I I A S A )  has under taken  an e x t e n s i v e  r e s e a r c h  program r e l a t e d  
t o  t h e  w o r l d  food s i t u a t i o n .  The m a j o r  p a r t  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  
has been t h e  development o f  a  w o r l d  f o o d  and a g r i c u l t u r e  
sys tem w h i c h  1  i n k s  a  s e r i e s  o f  n a t i o n a l  p o l  i c y  niodels i n  a  
genera l  e q u i  1  i b r i u m  framework. 
The Food and A g r i c u l t u r e  Program was deve loped  i n  o r d e r  t o  
examine t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between a g r i c u l t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  
marke ts  and n a t i o n a l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  i n  a  
1  ong-term c o n t e x t  ( 5  t o  15 y e a r s ) .  The model was i n t e n d e d  
b o t h  t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  p a t t e r n s  o f  p u b l i c  and 
p r i v a t e  dec i s ion -makers  and t o  t e s t  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  new p o l i c y  
a1 t e r n a t i v e s  so  as  t o  examine g rowth ,  e q u i t y ,  s u s t a i n a b i l  i t y  
and s t a b i l i t y  i s s u e s  r e l a t e d  t o  f o o d  p r o d u c t i o n ,  consumpt ion,  
and t r a d e  (see P a r i k h  and Rabar, 1981).  
The i n t e n t  o f  t h i s  paper  was t o  examine a l t e r n a t i v e  
approaches f o r  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  i n t o  t h e  B a s i c  L i n k e d  System 
(BLS) model t h o s e  m a j o r  p o l i c i e s  o f  a  c o u n t r y  wh ich  i n f l u e n c e  
t h e  w o r l d  and domes t i c  marke t  p r i c e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  and t h e  
l e v e l  o f  t r a d e  f o r  t h e  t e n  t r a d e d  commodi t ies .  
The s t u d y  focuses on Canada, b u t  t h e  approach s h o u l d  be 
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  o t h e r  c o u n t r y  models. The main  emphasis i s  on 
t h e  d o m e s t i c - i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e  d i f f e r e n c e  b u t  a l t e r n a t i v e  
approaches t o  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t r a d e  and s t o c k  
1  eve1 s  a r e  exami ned. 
1.2 Use o f  P o l i c v  I n s t r u m e n t s  
'The B a s i c  L i n k e d  System (BLS) i s  t h e  s e t  o f  s t a n d a r d i z e d  
c o u n t r y  models  wh ich  was deve loped w i t h  a  number o f  e x p l i c i t  
p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s  such as minimum and maximum p r i c e s ,  t r a d e  
quo tas ,  s t o c k  l e v e l s ,  t a x  r a t e s ,  b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e ,  t a r i f f s  
and s a v i n g s  r a t e .  Fo r  more d e t a i l  abou t  t h e  n a t u r e  and 
spec t rum o f  t hese ,  see Keyzer (1981). 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e s e  e x p l i c i t  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  c o u n t r i e s  
m a i n t a i n  a  s e r i e s  o f  r e g u l a t i o n s  ( h e a l t h ,  l a b e l  1  i n g ,  e t c . )  
and n o n - t a r i  f f  b a r r i e r s .  These, a1 ong w i t h  n a t u r a l  t r a d e  
b a r r i e r s  (e.g., t r a n s p o r t a t i o n )  i s o l a t e ,  t o  v a r y i n g  degrees,  
t h e  domes t i c  f r o m  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  marke ts .  A l l  o f  t h e s e  
p r o t e c t i o n  e f f e c t s  must  be i n c l u d e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  c o r r e c t l y  
r e p r e s e n t  w o r l d  marke t  p r i c e s  i n  domes t i c  markets .  To d a t e ,  
t h e  p r e s e n t  s i m u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  BLS have g e n e r a l l y  assumed a  
q u a s i  f r e e  m a r k e t  f o r  most  c o u n t r i e s ,  where e i t h e r  domes t i c  
and e x p o r t  p r i c e s  b e a r  a  c o n s t a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o r  domes t i c  
p r i c e s  t e n d  towards  w o r l d  p r i c e s  w i t h  a  d i s t r i b u t e d  l ag .  
It i s  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  t h e  key  p o l i c i e s  o f  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  BLS 
b e  e x p l i c i t l y  model led ,  u s i n g  t h o s e  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s  n o t e d  
above as  w e l l  as  i n c l u d i n g  o t h e r  p r o t e c t i o n  e f f e c t s .  T h i s  i s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  t h e  t r a d e  p o l  i c i e s  and t o  a  l e s s e r  
e x t e n t  f o r  t h e  s u p p l y  response p o l i c i e s .  I f  t h e s e  a r e  n o t  
i n c l u d e d ,  t h e n  t h e  e n t i  r e  model 1  oses much o f  i t s  v a l u e  as  a  
r e a c t i v e  p o l  i c y  model. 
O u t l i n e  o f  Paper 
I n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  paper,  t h e r e  i s  a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  
t h e  I IASA d a t a  base and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  p r i c e  s e r i e s  used. 
These d a t a  a r e  c r i t i c a l  i n  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  e x i s t i n g  domes t i c -  
w o r l d  p r i c e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  
domes t i c  m a r k e t  p r o t e c t i o n .  
The t h i r d  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  paper  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
o f  t h e  commodity marke ts  i n  Canada and main  p o l i c i e s  f o r  t h e  
b 
n i n e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  commodity groups.  P a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  i s  
p a i d  t o  t h o s e  p o l i c i e s  wh ich  can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  p o l i c y  
i n s t r u m e n t s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  a v a i l a b l e  w i t h i n  t h e  BLS. The 
d e s c r i p t i o n  c o v e r s  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  model e s t i m a t i o n  (1961-76)  
and r e c e n t  changes. 
The f o u r t h  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  paper  examines t h e  domes t i c  t o  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e  r e 1  a t i o n s h i p s .  T h i s  i n c l u d e s  t h e o r e t i c a l  
concep ts  o f  a  t r a d e  model, p roposes a  s i m p l e  model s t r u c t u r e  
t o  t e s t  t h e s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  and p r e s e n t s  and e v a l u a t e s  t h e  
r e s u l t s .  
The f i f t h  s e c t i o n  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  e x p l i c i t  p o l  i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s  
o f  t h e  B L S  and how t h e s e  a r e  o p e r a t e d  i n  t h e  model. The 
e x a c t  p r o c e d u r e  t o  f o l l o w  f o r  each o f  t h e s e  i n s t r u m e n t s  i s  
d e s c r i b e d  f o r  t h e  n i n e  commodi t ies  t o  r e p r e s e n t  e x i s t i n g  
p o l  i c i  es i n  Canada. 
I n  t h e  s i x t h  s e c t i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  an e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  
component c u r r e n t l y  used b y  IIASA i n  t h e  BLS. The approach 
i s  d e t a i l e d  a l o n g  w i t h  r e s u l t s  f o r  s e v e r a l  v e r s i o n s  o f  t h e  
p o l  i c y  component. F i n a l l y ,  a  summary o f  t h e  p o l  i c y  b l o c k  
p rocedures ,  p rob lems and s u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  change i s  p r o v i d e d  
i n  t h e  l a s t  s e c t i o n .  
2. I IASAPRICEDATA 
2.1 Method o f  C o n s t r u c t i o n  
The b a s i c  commodity q u a n t i t y  and p r i c e  d a t a  a r e  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  
t h e  FAO. U s i n g  w e i g h t i n g  p rocedures  deve loped  b y  I IASA, t h e  
FAP aggrega ted  t h e s e  d a t a  f o r  56 c o u n t r i e s  f r o m  600 t o  260 
commodi t ies  and t h e n  t o  27 commodi t ies  ( t h e  d e t a i l e d  
commodity l i s t )  and t o  16 commodi t ies ( t h e  s i m p l i f i e d  
commodity 1  i s t ) .  The domes t i c  p r i c e  d a t a  a r e  l a r g e l y  f o r  
f a r m - l e v e l  o r  unprocessed p roduc ts .  U n i t  e x p o r t  and i m p o r t  
p r i c e s  were d e r i v e d  f r o m  v a l u e  and volume o f  t r a d e .  These 
d a t a  a r e  d e s c r i b e d  i n  F i s c h e r  and F rohberg  (1980, p.11-32) 
and F i s c h e r  and S i c h r a  (1983).  
The f o l l o w i n g  p a r t  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  examines t h e  I IASA p r i c e  
s e r i e s  f o r  Canada. Comments a r e  m a i n l y  on t h e  p roducer  
p r i c e s  and t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  w o r l d  p r i c e s l ,  b u t  some 
comments on e x p o r t  u n i t  v a l u e  p r i c e s  a r e  a1 so i n c l u d e d .  A  
compar ison i s  made between t h e s e  d a t a  and t h o s e  pub1 i s h e d  by  
S t a t i s t i c s  Canada. Any s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  between 
Canadian and I IASA d a t a  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  t h e  e s t i m a t i o n  o f  
t h e  model d e s c r i b e d  i n  S e c t i o n s  4 and 6. I n  genera l ,  t h e  
e x a c t  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e s e  I IASA p r i c e s  i s  u n c l e a r ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  as t o  t h e  t i m e  p e r i o d  r e p r e s e n t e d  ( i  .e., c r o p  
v e r s u s  c a l e n d a r  y e a r ) .  We hope t h a t  some o f  t h e  apparen t  
e r r o r s  a r e  c o r r e c t e d  i n  t h e  updated d a t a  tapes.2  
l ~ h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  i s  d e f i n e d  i n  t h i s  s t u d y  as  t h e  l o w e s t  p r i c e  o f  an 
,expor ter  wh ich  has a  s i g n i f i c a n t  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  w o r l d  markets .  
L ~ n  r e v i e w  o f  s t a t i s t i c s - o n  p r i c e s '  Received by  Farmers, FAO, 1982, 
i t  has been n o t e d  t h a t  k A U  used e s t i m a t e s  f o r  many Canadian p r i c e s  
i n  1975. Bo th  I IASA and FA0 have been n o t i f i e d  o f  o f f i c i a l  . 
Canadian p r i c e s  f o r  1975 f o r  t h e s e  commodi t ies.  Other  d i f f e r e n c e s  
can a l s o  be t r a c e d  t o  v a r y i n g  d e f i n i t i o n s  f o r  commodity y e a r .  
Tab1 e  2.1 shows r e s u l t s  o f  r e g r e s s i o n s  w h i c h  r e l a t e  
S t a t i s t i c s  Canada commodity p r i c e  d a t a  t o  ( i )  I IASA d a t a  f o r  
Canadian domes t i c  p r i c e s  and ( i i )  I IASA d a t a  f o r  w o r l d  p r i c e s  
f o r  n i n e  commodi t ies.3 
F o r  t h e  f i r s t  s e t  o f  compar isons r e l a t i n g  t h e  two  Canadian 
d a t a  s e r i e s ,  t h e  i n t e r c e p t  s h o u l d  be z e r o  and c o e f f i c i e n t  
s h o u l d  be one. I n  v i r t u a l l y  e v e r y  case,  d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t s  
a r e  ob ta ined .  I n  t h e  second s e t  o f  cornpar isons r e l a t i n g  
S t a t i s t i c s  Canada Canadian d a t a  t o  I IASA w o r l d  p r i c e s ,  a  
s i m i l a r  r e s u l t  wou ld  be expec ted  f o r  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  ( i .e. ,  
one)  and t h e  i n t e r c e p t  wou ld  r e f l e c t  t r a n s f e r  c o s t s  ( i .e. ,  
n e g a t i v e  f o r  e x p o r t s  and p o s i t i v e  f o r  i m p o r t s )  f o r  t h e s e  
commodi t ies  w h i c h  a r e  f r e e l y  t r a d e d  (wheat,  c o a r s e  g r a i n s ,  
p r o t e i n  feed,  b e e f ,  p o r k ) .  T h i s  appears  t o  be t h e  case f o r  
a1 1  t h o s e  p r o d u c t s  e x c e p t  f o r  o i l  seeds. The r e s u l t s  f o r  
f r u i t  and v e g e t a b l e s  appear s t r a n g e  because o f  t h e  l o w  v a l u e  
o f  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s .  A1 so, c o e f f i c i e n t  v a l u e s  f o r  d a i r y  and 
p o u l t r y  may r e f l e c t  e i t h e r  a  r a p i d l y  r i s i n g  d o m e s t i c  marke t  
p r i c e s  o r  a  h i g h l y  s u b s i d i z e d  e x p o r t  p r i c e .  The l a r g e  
n e g a t i v e  i n t e r c e p t  on p o u l t r y  i s  unexp l  a i  nab1 e. 
Comparison w i t h  Canadian Sources 
2.2.1 Wheat and Coarse G r a i n s  
F o r  t h e  Canadian domes t i c  p r i c e  t h e r e  appears  t o  be an 
i n c o n s i s t e n c y  i n  t h e  d a t a  between t h o s e  r e p o r t e d  f o r  
1961-74 and f o r  1975-76, t h e  l a t t e r  b e i n g  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
h i g h .  The i n c r e a s e  i n  w o r l d  wheat p r i c e s  o c c u r r e d  i n  
t h e  1973/74 c r o p  y e a r  b u t  t h e  I IASA d a t a  i n d i c a t e  t h i s  
' ~ o d e l  i s  s p e c i f i e d  as :  Y = a  + BX 
Where Y i s  S t a t i s t i c s  Canada f a r m  l e v e l  d a t a  and where X i s  I IASA 
d a t a  f o r  fa rm l e v e l  and w o r l d  l e v e l  p r i c e s .  Model i s  e s t i m a t e d  by 
OLS f o r  t h e  1961-76 p e r i o d .  
TABLE 2.1: RELATIONSHIP OF COMMODITY PRICES FROM STATISTICS CANADA 
DATA TO I IASA (FAO) DATA FOR DOMESTIC CANADIAN MARKETS AND 
WORLD MARKETS, 1961-1976 
Domestic P r i c e  World P r i c e  
Commodi t y  I n t e r c e p t  L o e t t ~  c l e n t  I n t e r c e p t  L o e t t ~ c l e n t  
Wheat 15.77 
( 6 . 0 3 ) ~  
Coarse 8.87 
Gra ins  (2.776) 






P o u l t r y  -1427.85 
(429.53) 
Vegetabl  es 53.00 
(14.32) 
F r u i t s  31.54 
(6.10) 
aStandard e r r o r s  i n  b r a c k e t s .  
Source: S t a t i s t i c s  Canada and IIASA. 
o c c u r r e d  i n  1974. T h i s  wou ld  i m p l y  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  p a r t  
o f  t h e  I IASA d a t a  a r e  based on a  c a l e n d a r  i n s t e a d  o f  a  
c r o p  y e a r .  'The u n i t  e x p o r t  p r i c e s  f o r  Canada appear  
r e a s o n a b l e ,  e x c e p t  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  a p p a r e n t l y  l o w  
1973-74 r e p o r t e d  w o r l d  p r i c e s .  
2.2.2 Bov ine  
The d o m e s t i c  p r i c e s  appear l o w  f o r  Canada by a b o u t  20 
p e r c e n t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  1975 v a l u e  r e l a t i v e  t o  
e x p o r t ,  i m p o r t  and w o r l d  p r i c e s .  The 1972 p r i c e  
i n c r e a s e  n o t e d  i n  Canadian d a t a  s o u r c e s  i s  shown i n  
t h e  I IASA d a t a  i n  1971. 
2.2.3 D a i r y  
A1 1  o f  t h e  d a i r y  p r i c e  d a t a  appear  t o  be t o o  l o w  and 
some o f  t h e  p r i c e  d e c l i n e s  a r e  l a r g e  (e.g., t h e  1964 
v a l u e  d e c l i n e s  f o u r  p e r c e n t ) .  I IASA shows t h a t  p r i c e s  
d e c l i n e d  f r o m  1975 t o  1976 by  $15 / t ,  whereas a c c o r d i n g  
t o  Canadian d a t a  sou rces  t h e y  i n c r e a s e d  by  $4.5/t .  
T h i s  may be due t o  d i f f e r e n t  a g g r e g a t i o n  p rocedures  o r  
d e f i n i t i o n s  used.4 
2.2.4 P r o t e i n  f eeds  
The d a t a  f o r  1974-76 appear  u n r e a s o n a b l y  h i g h .  S ince  
t h e r e  i s  f r e e  i m p o r t a t i o n  o f  p r o t e i n  meal ,  a  c l o s e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  w o r l d  p r i c e s  i s  expected.  A c c o r d i n g  
t o  I IASA d a t a ,  t h i s  o c c u r r e d  u n t i l  1974, t h e n  Canadian 
p r i c e s  r o s e  t o  t w i c e  t h e  w o r l d  l e v e l .  I IASA u n i t  
4 ~ o r  Canadian d a t a ,  p r i c e  i s  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  t o t a l  p r o d u c e r  r e t u r n s  
and t o t a l  p r o d u c t i o n .  I IASA agg rega tes  a  s e r i e s  o f  p r o d u c t  
p r i c e s .  
e x p o r t  and impo r t  p r i c e s  f o r  Canada a r e  c l o s e  t o  
producer  p r i c e s  (and wo r l d  p r i c e s )  u n t i l  t h i s  per iod .  
There i s  no reason f o r  any d ivergence,  s i n c e  t h e r e  i s  
f r e e  t r a d e  f o r  o i l s e e d  p roduc ts .  
2.2.5 Other meals 
The IIASA p r i c e s  f o r  po rk  appear about t e n  percen t  
below t hose  f rom Canadian sources o f  data.  P r i c e s  f o r  
p o u l t r y  and eggs appear lower  t han  those  es t imated  by 
A g r i c u l t u r e  Canada by a lmost  50 percen t .  For  f i s h ,  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between w o r l d  and much h i g h e r  domest ic 
p r i c e s  r e p o r t e d  by IIASA of  one hundred percen t  appear 
unreasonable,  s i n c e  Canada expo r t s  much o f  i t s  
p roduc t ion .  Furthermore, i n t h e  case of  processed 
and unprocessed products ,  t h e  h i g h  u n i t  e x p o r t  p r i c e s  
appear t o  i n d i c a t e  a  q u a l . i t y  premium f o r  Canadian 
expor ts .  
2.2.6 Other food  
The year - to -year  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  f r u i t  p r i c e s  a r e  
s i m i l a r  t o  those  r e p o r t e d  i n  Canadian da ta  sources, 
whereas vegetab l  e  p r i c e s  f r e q u e n t l y  a r e  no t .  P r i ces  
1  eve1 s  f o r  bo th  Canadian sources a r e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
1  ower t han  r e p o r t e d  by IIASA. 
3. AGRICULTURE COMMODITY POLICY I N  CANADA 
3.1 Overv iew 
The a g r i c u l t u r a l  economy i n  Canada i s  r e l a t i v e l y  open t o  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  markets .  Trade i s  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  t o  Canadian 
a g r i c u l t u r e  and t h e  Canadian economy. Fo r  example, abou t  
s e v e n t y - f i v e  p e r c e n t  o f  Canadian wheat i s  e x p o r t e d  and, i n  
t o t a l ,  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e x p o r t s  a r e  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  abou t  f o r t y  
p e r c e n t  o f  f a r m  cash r e c e i p t s .  A g r i c u l t u r e  accoun ts  f o r  
abou t  t e n  p e r c e n t  o f  a l l  e x p o r t s  f r o m  Canada and has 
c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  a  p o s i t i v e  b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e .  
A g r i c u l t u r a l  p o l  i c i e s  w h i c h  i n f l u e n c e  t r a d e  have been 
des igned  t o  a  l a r g e  degree t o  p r o t e c t  p r o d u c e r s  and consumers 
a g a i n s t  s h o r t - t e r m  i n s t a b i l i t y  f r o m  b o t h  n a t u r a l  and f o r e i g n -  
p o l i c y - i n d u c e d  sources.  These p o l i c i e s  have g e n e r a l l y  had 
o n l y  s m a l l  e f f e c t  on marke t  p r i c e s  f o r  g r a i n s  and r e d  meats. 
However, f o r  d a i r y ,  p o u l t r y  and many h o r t i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s ,  
p o l i c i e s  have been i n s t i t u t e d  t o  i s o l a t e  domes t i c  f r o m  w o r l d  
markets .  Fo r  t h e s e  s e c t o r s ,  p r i c e s  a r e  l a r g e l y  s e t  t h r o u g h  
c o s t - o f - p r o d u c t i o n  fo rmu lae ,  and r i g i d  p r o d u c t i o n  c o n t r o l s  
e x i s t .  F o r  t h o s e  commodi t ies  w h i c h  have s u p p l y  management 
c o n t r o l s ,  i m p o r t s  a r e  r e s t r i c t e d  t h r o u g h  quo tas ,  l a r g e l y  
u s i n g  t h e  E x p o r t  and I m p o r t  P e r m i t s  Act .  Producer  m a r k e t i n g  
boards  have been i n s t i t u t e d  f o r  many o f  t h e s e  commodi t ies.  
I n p u t s  p o l  i c i e s  a r e  genera l  l y  n o t  commodi t y - s p e c i  fi c. 
A g r i c u l t u r a l  p o l  i c y  and programs have p l a y e d  a  m i n o r  r o l e  i n  
a f f e c t i n g  i n p u t  use  and p r i c e s .  An e x c e p t i o n  i s  r e s e a r c h  
and e x t e n s i o n  wh ich  i s  h e a v i l y  government funded. 
Canada has t h r e e  systems o f  t a r i f f s :  B r i t i s h  P r e f e r e n t i a l  
(BP), Most  Favoured N a t i o n  (MFN) and t h e  General P r e f e r e n t i a l  
(GP). T a r i f f s  have g e n e r a l l y  had o n l y  a s m a l l  i m p a c t  on 
t r a d e .  Seasonal t a r i f f s  a r e  used f o r  many f r e s h  f r u i t s  and 
vege tab les .  The GATT Tokyo Round l o w e r e d  many t a r i f f s  and 
nar rowed t h e  gap between BP and MFN r a t e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  on 
p r o d u c t s  t r a d e d  between Canada and t h e  U.S. N o n - t a r i f f  
b a r r i e r s  ( h e a l t h  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  l a b e l  l i n g  requ i remen ts ,  e t c . ) ,  
and q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on f o r  example f o r  d a i r y  
p r o d u c t s ,  c e r e a l s ,  p o u l t r y  and eggs, and beef and p e r i o d i c  
t a r i f f  s l ~ r c h a r g e s ,  have g e n e r a l  l y  been more e f f e c t i  ve t h a n  
t a r i f f s  t o  p r o t e c t  domes t i c  p roducers .  
The f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  o u t l i n e s  t h e  m a j o r  p o l i c i e s  f o r  Canada 
f o r  each o f  t h e  t e n  l IASA commodity groups.  The p o l i c y  
d e s c r i p t i o n  r e l a t e s  t o  t h o s e  e x i s t i n g  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  
t h e  e s t i m a t i o n  (1961-76). Any commodity changes s i n c e  1976 
a r e  n o t e d  i n  t h e  s e c t i o n  on new developments.  
3.2 Commodity Pol  i c i e s  1961 -76 
3.2.1 Wheat 
( a )  General Pol i ' c i e s / I n s t i  t u t i o n s  
About  95 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  wheat produced i n  Canada i s  
grown i n  t h e  d e s i g n a t e d  a rea  under  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  
t h e  Canadian Wheat Board (C.W.B.)l, The C.W.B. 
c o n t r o l s  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  o f  a l l  wheat  f o r  e x p o r t  and s a l e  
o u t s i d e  t h e  d e s i g n a t e d  a rea  ( e x c e p t  o f  o f f - b o a r d  f e e d  
l ~ n d e r  t h e  Canadian Wheat Board Ac t ,  t h e  d e s i g n a t e d  a rea  i s  
Mani toba,  Saskatchewan, A1 b e r t a ,  t h e  Peace R i  v e r  Di s t r i c t  and 
Creston-Wynndel Areas o f  B r i t i s h  Columbia, and g r a i n s  i n c l  ude 
wheat,  o a t s ,  b a r l e y ,  r y e ,  rapeseed and f l a x s e e d .  
wheat s a l e s  s i n c e  1974).2 Producers  a r e  i s s u e d  
m a r k e t i n g  q u o t a s  based on c u l t i v a t e d  acreage and any 
g r a i n  n o t  e l i g i b l e  f o r  d e l i v e r y  t o  t h e  C.W.B. must  be 
s t o r e d  on farms,  f e d  t o  l i v e s t o c k  o r  s o l d  t o  o t h e r  l o c a l  
p roducers .  
P roducers  a r e  e l i g i b l e  f o r  advance payments f o r  
f a rm-s to red  g ra in .3  Producers  can purchase c r o p  
i n s u r a n c e  t o  p r o t e c t  a g a i n s t  l o s s e s  f rom weather,  
d i s e a s e  o r  pes ts .  An acreage d i v e r s i o n  program i n  1970, 
c a l l e d  LIFT, g r e a t l y  reduced wheat acreage i n  1970 and 
t o  a  l e s s e r  e x t e n t  f o r  s e v e r a l  y e a r s  t h e r e a f t e r .  
Canada has n e g o t i a t e d  s e v e r a l  b i l a t e r a l  l o n g - t e r m  agree-  
ments. These have been p a r t i c u l a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  w i t h  t h e  
U.S.S.R. and China. The agreements have g e n e r a l l y  s p e c i -  
f i e d  minimum and maximum annua l  l e v e l s  o f  g r a i n  t r a d e .  
Canada i s  an i m p o r t a n t  c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  b i l a t e r a l  food a i d  
programs, d o n a t i n g  abou t  0.6-1.0 m i l l i o n  t o n s  a n n u a l l y .  
( b )  P r i c i n g  P o l i c i e s  
Producers  a r e  guaran teed  an i n i t i a l  p r i c e  w h i c h  i s  p a i d  
upon d e l i v e r y  t o  t h e  C.W.B. A  f i n a l  payment, based upon 
a  f i n a l  annua l  average n e t  ( p o o l e d )  p r i c e ,  i s  p a i d  6-7 
months a f t e r  t h e  c r o p  y e a r .  A  f i n a l  payment f o r  wheat 
has been made e v e r y  y e a r  e x c e p t  f o r  1968/69. The 
announcement d a t e  o f  i n i t i a l  p r i c e s  has v a r i e d  f r o m  
p r i o r  t o  p l a n t i n g  t o  a f t e r  p l a n t i n g  i n t e n t i o n s  a r e  
known. Thus, i n i t i a l  p r i c e s  have had d i f f e r i n g  e f f e c t s  
on p l a n t i n g  d e c i s i o n s .  
'see s e c t i o n  on c o a r s e  g r a i n s .  
3 ~ h e  P r a i r i e  G r a i n s  Advance Payment A c t  p r o v i d e s  i n t e r e s t - f r e e  cash 
advances o f  up t o  $15,000 p e r  p roducer  on t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  
f a r m - s t o r e d  wheat, o a t s  and b a r l e y .  
Minimum and maximum p r o d u c e r  s e l l i n g  p r i c e  and f l o u r  
m i l l e r  b u y i n g  p r i c e s  f o r  domes t i c  consumpt ion  have been 
e s t a b l i s h e d  s i n c e  1968, f o l l o w i n g  t h e  breakdown o f  t h e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  G r a i n s  Arrangement. F i r s t ,  t h e s e  p r i c e s  
s u b s i d i z e d  t h e  p roducer  as domes t i c  p r i c e s  exceeded 
w o r l d  1  e v e l  s  (1968-73) and subsequen t l y  s u b s i d i z e d  t h e  
consumer as domes t i c  p r i c e s  were be low w o r l d  l e v e l s  
(1968-73). P r i c e  l e v e l s  f o r  t h i s  p e r i o d  a r e  shown i n  
T a b l e  3.1. 
P r a i r i e  g r a i n  p roducers  b e n e f i t  f r o m  f i x e d  r a t e s  on r a i l  
movements o f  g r a i n  t o  e x p o r t  p o i n t s .  The r a t e s ,  known 
a s  t h e  Crows Nest  Pass r a t e s ,  have been f r o z e n  a t  t h e i r  
1922 1  e v e l  s, t h e r e b y  p e r m i t t i n g  domes t i c  g r a i n  p r i c e s  t o  
r i s e  t o  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  t h a n  i f  f u l l  c o s t  t r a n s p o r t  r a t e s  
had been used. A  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  s u b s i d y  i s  p a i d  on 
r e g i o n a l  f e e d g r a i n  sh ipments  ( d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  f e e d g r a i n  
s e c t i o n ) .  
V a r i o u s  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  s u b s i d i e s  t o  t h e  r a i l r o a d s  a l s o  
e x i s t ,  such as  b r a n c h l i n e  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  s u b s i d i e s ,  
hopper  c a r  l e a s e  and purchase,  and box c a r  
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n ,  t o  o f f s e t  l o s s e s  t o  t h e  r a i l r o a d s  f r o m  
t h e  l o w  Crows Nest  Pass r a t e s .  
S t a b i  1  i z a t i o n  payments under  t h e  1958 A g r i c u l t u r a l  
S t a b i l i z a t i o n  A c t  were p a i d  t o  wheat produced i n  t h e  
non-des igna ted  a reas  i f  p r i c e s  f e l l  be low e i g h t y  p e r c e n t  
o f  a  t e n - y e a r  average.  
Canadian wheat commands a  premium p r i c e  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
m a r k e t s  o v e r  o t h e r  l o w e r  p r o t e i n  and s o f t  wheats. T h i s  
premium has v a r i e d  o v e r  t i m e  and f r o m  season t o  season, 
depend ing on q u a l i t y  l e v e l s  and m a r k e t  c o n d i t i o n s .  
TABLE 3.1. MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM WHEAT PRICES FOR PRODUCERS AND 
MILLERS, 1969-80 FOR DOMESTIC FOOD USEa 
P r i c e  t o  Producers  P r i c e  t o  M i l l e r s  
Mlnlmum - Maximum 
Nov. 5/69 
-1972 71.65 
Jan. 1972b 110.23 71.65 
Sept. 11/1973b 119.42 183.72 119.42 
May 197% 130.45 183.72 119.42 
Nov. 2811 978c 146.98 183.72 146.98 - 183.72d 
Aug 1/1980 183.72 257.21 183.72 - 257.21 
a ~ o r  No. 1 Canadian Western Red S p r i n g  Wheat, b a s i s  Thunder Bay. 
b ~ o v e r n m e n t  p a i d  d i f f e r e n c e  between m i l l  p r i c e  and e x p o r t  p r i c e  up 
t o  t h e  maximum. 
CNo f u r t h e r  government subs idy .  
d ~ r i c e s  t o  m i l l e r s  were f i x e d  f o r  two  months, (e.g. p r i c e s  on 
December 1 5 t h  wou ld  be i n  e f f e c t  f o r  January  and Februa ry ) .  
( c )  Trade P o l i c i e s  
I m p o r t s  o f  wheat r e q u i r e  an a l l o c a t i o n  o f  p e r m i t s  i s s u e d  
b y  t h e  C.W.B. T a r i f f s  on  wheat a r e  f r e e  under  t h e  
B r i t i s h  P r e f e r e n c e  (BP) and 12C/bushel ($4 .41/ t )  under  
Most  Favoured N a t i o n a l  (MFN) r a t e s .  
E x p o r t s  have been a s s i s t e d  t h r o u g h  c r e d i t  and l o a n  
guarantees.  These s u b s i d i e s  have been r e l a t i v e l y  m i n o r  
( u s u a l  l y  under  $5 m i  11 i o n  annual  l y ) .  
The Canadian t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and h a n d l i n g  sys tem c a p a c i t y  
c o n s t r a i n t s  h a v e l i m i t e d  wheat e x p o r t s  f o r  much o f  t h e  
p e r i o d  under  rev iew .  
( d )  Stock Pol  i c y  
I n  t h e  1950 's  and 19601s,  t h e  C.W.B. appeared t o  accu-  
m u l a t e  wheat s t o c k s  t o  p r e v e n t  a  d e c l i n e  i n  w o r l d  wheat 
p r i c e s . 4  I n  t u r n ,  t h i s  f o r c e d  g r a i n  p roducers  t o  
i n c r e a s e  farm-he ld  s t o c k s ,  s i n c e  t h e  C.W.B. c o u l d  n o t  
a c c e p t  a d d i t i o n a l  d e l  i v e r i e s  o f  g r a i n .  S i n c e  1973, t h e r e  
i s  no e v i d e n c e  t h a t  t h e  Board  i s  f o l l o w i n g  t h i s  p o l i c y .  
Such a  p o l  i c y  wou ld  n o t  have t h e  i m p a c t  o f  e a r l i e r  
p e r i o d s ,  a s  Canada's s h a r e  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  i n  wheat i s  
much s m a l l  e r .  
( e )  New Developments 
The Western G r a i n  S t a b i l i z a t i o n  Program f o r  t h e  C.W.B. 
a r e a  was i n t r o d u c e d  i n  1976. T h i s  program i s  v o l u n t a r y  
and j o i n t l y  funded b y  government (213 )  and p roducers  
( 1 3 )  It was des igned  t o  s t a b i l i z e  n e t  cash f l o w ,  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  between t o t a l  r e c e i p t s  f r o m  t h e  s a l e  o f  t h e  
seven m a j o r  c e r e a l s  and o i l s e e d s  and t h e  cash c o s t s  o f  
p r o d u c t i o n .  
F o r  t h e  non-C.W.B. area,  t h e  A g r i c u l t u r a l  S t a b i l  i z a t i o n  
A c t  (1975) i n c r e a s e d  t h e  s u p p o r t  t o  90 p e r c e n t  o f  p r e -  
v i o u s  f i v e  y e a r s ,  a d j u s t e d  f o r  changes i n  cash c o s t s .  
A  b i l l  t o  amend t h e  Crows Nest  Pass t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  r a t e s  
was i n t r o d u c e d  i n  Par1 iament  i n  Februa ry  1983 and w i l l  
l i k e l y  r e s u l t  i n  r a t e s  r e f l e c t i n g  p a r t  o f  t h e  h i g h e r  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  c o s t s .  
4 ~ o a r d  s t o c k s  were i n c r e a s e d  when w o r l d  p r i c e s  d e c l i n e d  d u r i n g  t h i s  
p e r i o d ,  when Canada accounted f o r  o v e r  20 p e r c e n t  o f  w o r l d  wheat 
t r a d e .  
The two p r i c e  wheat program f o r  domes t i c  wheat 
consumpt ion  n o t e d  above remains unchanged w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  
minimum and maximum p r i c e s .  
3.2.2 R ice  
Most o f  t h e  r i c e  consumed i n  Canada i s  i m p o r t e d  a t  
w o r l d  p r i c e s  w i t h o u t  a  t a r i f f .  
3.2.3 Coarse G r a i n s  
( a )  General Pol  i c i e s / I n s t i t u t i o n s  
General  l y  p o l  i c i e s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  f o r  c o a r s e  g r a i n s  
a r e  s i m i l a r  t o  wheat when i t  i s  p roduced i n  t h e  
d e s i g n a t e d  area.  A h i g h e r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  c o a r s e  g r a i n s  
t h a n  wheat i s  grown o u t s i d e  t h e  d e s i g n a t e d  a r e a  and most  
p r o d u c t i o n  u n t i l  r e c e n t l y  was consumed i n  Canada, u n l i k e  
wheat.  
P r i c i n g  P o l i c i e s  
I n  t h e  d e s i g n a t e d  a rea ,  p roducers  d e l i v e r i n g  f e e d  g r a i n  
t o  t h e  C.W.B. r e c e i v e  i n i t i a l  and f i n a l  p o o l e d  p r i c e s  
s i m i l a r  t o  wheat. I n  E a s t e r n  Canada, t h e  i m p o r t  p r i c e  
f o r  U.S. c o r n  p r o v i d e s  a  c e i l i n g  p r i c e  f o r  p roducers .  
S i n c e  1974, a  p r i c i n g  f o r m u l a  d i r e c t l y  t i e d  t h e  s e l l i n g  
p r i c e  o f  wes te rn  g r a i n  by  t h e  C.W.B. i n  E a s t e r n  Canada 
t o  t h e  U.S. c o r n  i m p o r t  p r i c e  a t  Mon t rea l .  
I n  Western Canada, g r a i n  can a1 so be s o l d  by  p r o d u c e r s  
i n  t h e  o f f - B o a r d  marke t ,  and t h i s  i n c r e a s e s  e s p e c i a l l y  
when Wheat Board m a r k e t i n g  quotas  a r e  r e s t r i c t i v e .  A 
s u b s t a n t i a l  p r i c e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  between board  and 
o f f - b o a r d  marke ts  has e x i s t e d ,  such as  d u r i n g  t h e  
1969-70 p e r i o d .  I n  1974, P r a i r i e  p r o d u c e r s  were g i v e n  
t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  s e l l  non-C.W.B. q u o t a  g r a i n  o u t s i d e  
t h e  C.W.B. area.  
Canadian b a r l e y  has s o l  d  a t  p e r i o d i c  preniiuins and 
d i  scoun ts  r e 1  a t i v e  t o  c o r n  p r i c e s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
marke ts .  These premiums and d i s c o u n t s  have been as 
l a r g e  a s  25 p e r c e n t  d u r i n g  t h e  1970 's  and a r e  l a r g e l y  
based on a v a i l a b i l  i t i e s  o f  b a r l e y  r e l a t i v e  t o  c o r n ,  
p r i c e  o f  p r o t e i n  f e e d  and end-use o f  t h e  g r a i n .  
F e e d g r a i n  movements f r o m  t h e  P r a i r i e s  i n t o  B r i t i s h  
Columbia and E a s t e r n  Canada have been s u b s i d i z e d  under  
t h e  Feed F r e i g h t  A s s i s t a n c e  Program s i n c e  1941.5 
The program was i n t e n d e d  t o  e q u a l i z e  t h e  w h o l e s a l e  c o s t  
o f  P r a i r i e  g r a i n  a t  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  t h e  Thunder Bay l e v e l  
i n  a l l  p r o v i n c e s .  I n  1976/77, s u b s i d y  r a t e s  and 
e l i g i b l e  l o c a t i o n s  were reduced. As w e l l ,  i t s  b e n e f i t  
has eroded s i n c e  r a t e s  have been h e l d  c o n s t a n t  i n  t h e  
A t l a n t i c  r e g i o n .  I n  1981/82, a l i nos t  2  m i l l i o n  tonnes  
were  sh ipped  w i t h  a  $15.4 m i l l i o n  subs idy ,  r a n g i n g  f r o m  
$3.55/t i n t o  Quebec and $28.57/t i n t o  Newfound1 and. 
I m p o r t s  ( o r  e x p o r t s )  o f  b a r l e y ,  o a t s ,  and r y e  r e q u i r e  
i m p o r t  ( o r  e x p o r t )  p e r m i t s  f r o m  t h e  C.W.B. Corn i m p o r t s  
were  s u b j e c t  t o  a  t a r i f f  o f  84/bu. ($3 .15/ t ) .  
5 ~ h e  L i v e s t o c k  Feed A s s i s t a n c e  A c t  p r o v i d e s  f o r  s u b s i d i z a t i o n  o f  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  c o s t s  o f  g r a i n  f r o m  t h e  d e s i g n a t e d  area,  and O n t a r i o  
c o r n  i n t o  B r i t i s h  Columbia, E a s t e r n  Quebec and t h e  A t l a n t i c  
P r o v i n c e s .  
( c )  Stock P o l i c y  
A s i m i l a r  p o l i c y  e x i s t s  as  i n  t h e  case  o f  wheat, b u t  
s t o c k  p o l i c y  has n o t  been as i m p o r t a n t  f o r  c o a r s e  
g r a i n s .  
(d )  New Devel opment s  
The p r i c i n g  fo rmu la  f o r  f e e d g r a i n s  s o l d  i n t o  E a s t e r n  
Canada, based on c o r n  i m p o r t  p r i c e s ,  may be m o d i f i e d  t o  
p r o v i d e  more f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  c a p t u r e  premiums f o r  b a r l e y  
above e q u i v a l e n t  c o r n  p r i c e s  i n  w o r l d  markets .  The c o r n  
i m p o r t  t a r i f f  i s  t o  be reduced i n  annua l  i nc remen ts  f r o m  
1980-87 f r o m  8.04 t o  4.0Q/bu. ($1 .58/ t ) .  
3.2.4 Bov ine and Ov ine 
( a )  Genera1 &Po l  i c i e s / I n s t i  t u t i o n s  
W h i l e  Canada i s  a  s m a l l  n e t  e x p o r t e r  o f  beef, 1  a r g e  
t r a d e  f l ows  o f  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  b e e f  e x i s t .  S i n c e  
1969, s i z e a b l e  i m p o r t s  o f  g r a s s - f e d  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  t y p e  
b e e f  have come f r o m  Oceanic c o u n t r i e s .  The US 
p e r i o d i c a l  l y  e x p o r t s  1  a r g e  numbers o f  1  i v e  g r a i n - f e d  
s l a u g h t e r  c a t t l e ,  and Canada e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  U.S. feeder  
c a t t l e  and c a l v e s  and s l a u g h t e r  cows. Both  v e a l  and 
sheep meat t r a d e  a r e  s m a l l  i n  compar ison t o  beef. 
( b )  P r i c i n g  P o l i c i e s  
U. S. p r i c e s  1  a r g e l y  d e t e r m i n e  Canadian domes t i c  p r i c e s  
a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  Canada's a c t i v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  i n  
beef. P r o d u c t i o n  o f  g r a i n - f e d ,  y o u t h f u l  b e e f  
p redomina tes  i n  t h e  N o r t h  American b e e f  economy and 
s i g n i f i c a n t  premiums e x i s t  o v e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  g r a s s - f e d  
beef  p r i c e s .  The A g r i c u l t u r a l  S t a b i l i z a t i o n  Program 
(1958)  has p r o v i d e d  s u p p o r t  t o  b o t h  s l a u g h t e r  c a t t l e  and 
f e e d e r  c a t t l e .  Payments were made i n  1974/75 o f  $62 
m i l l i o n  and 1976177 o f  $47 m i l l i o n .  A  number o f  
p r o v i n c i a l  government programs a l s o  have been i n t r o d u c e d  
t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  c a t t l e  s e c t o r .  
( c )  Trade P o l i c i e s  
Bee f  and v e a l  have a  4.54/1 b. ( $ 9 9 / t )  t a r i f f .  Lamb and 
m u t t o n  have a  4.04/lb. ( $ 8 8 / t )  BP t a r i f f  and 4.94/lb. 
( $ 1 0 8 / t )  MFN t a r i f f .  T a r i f f s  a r e  s m a l l  r e l a t i v e  t o  
t o t a l  va lue.  V o l u n t a r y  q u o t a s  on Oceanic i m p o r t s  were i n  
p l a c e  d u r i n g  1973-77. A  number o f  t r a d e  r e s t r a i n t s  on 
U.S.-Canada t r a d e  were i n t r o d u c e d  d u r i n g  t h e  1973/74 
p e r i o d ,  wh ich  d i s t o r t e d  t r a d i t i o n a l  U.S.-Canada p r i c e  
r e 1  a t i o n s h i  ps. 
H e a l t h  r e s t r i c t i o n s  p r e v e n t  i m p o r t s  o f  1  i v e  a n i m a l s  and 
meat f r o m  many r e g i o n s  o f  t h e  w o r l d  where f o o t  and mouth 
d i s e a s e  e x i s t s .  L i v e  a n i m a l s  must  undergo a  q u a r a n t i n e  
p e r i o d  b e f o r e  i r n p o r t a t i  on. 
( d )  S tocks  
Beef s t o c k s  a r e  genera l  l y  s m a l l  and p r i v a t e l y  h e l d .  
( e )  New Devel opments 
A  Meat I m p o r t  Law was deve loped and i n t r o d u c e d  t o  
r e p l a c e  v o l u n t a r y  quo tas  on i m p o r t s  f r o m  Oceania. The 
Law i s  des igned  t o  be c o u n t e r c y c l  i c a l  , a1 1 owi ng h i g h e s t  
l e v e l  o f  i m p o r t s  when domes t i c  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  l o w e s t ,  and 
v i c e  versa.  
T a r i f f s  on b e e f  and vea l  d e c l i n e d  t o  24 / l b .  ( $ 4 4 / t )  i n  
1981 and lamb BP t a r i f f s  w i l l  d e c l i n e  f r o m  44 t o  34/ lb .  
i n  1987. 
3.2.5 D a i r y  P r o d u c t s  
General Pol  i c i e s / I n s t i  t u t i o n s  
M i l k  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  Canada i s  h i g h l y  r e g u l a t e d  w i t h  
p r o d u c e r  p r o d u c t i o n  quo tas ,  c o s t  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r m u l a  
p r i c i n g  and r e s t r i c t e d  t r a d e .  There  a r e  two  d i s t i n c t  
m a r k e t s  - f l u i d  m i l k  and i n d u s t r i a l  m i l k  and cream. 
Separa te  p r o d u c t i o n  q u o t a s  e x i s t  f o r  each. I n d u s t r i a l  
m i l k  q u o t a s  a r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  b a l a n c e  s u p p l y  and demand 
on t h e  domes t i c  m a r k e t  f o r  b u t t e r f a t .  The c u r r e n t  
p o l  i c y  a d m i n i s t e r e d  by  t h e  Canadian D a i r y  Commission f o r  
i n d u s t r i a l  m i l k  was i n t r o d u c e d  i n  1967 and has remained 
l a r g e l y  unchanged s i n c e  t h a t  t ime.6  Per c a p i t a  
consumpt ion  o f  d a i r y  p r o d u c t s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  b u t t e r ,  has 
been d e c l i n i n g .  
( b )  P r i c i n g  P o l i c y  
A  c o s t  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  p r i c i n g  f o r m u l a  e x i s t s  f o r  
i n d u s t r i a l  m i l k  a t  t h e  p r o d u c e r  l e v e l .  P r i c e s  a r e  
a d j u s t e d  q u a r t e r l y  t o  r e f l e c t  chang ing  c o s t s .  F l u i d  m i l k  
p r i c e s  a r e  s e t  a t  a p r o v i n c i a l  l e v e l  u s u a l l y  b y  a  
f o r m u l a  o r  n e g o t i a t i o n  and command a  premium o v e r  
i n d u s t r i a l  m i l k .  P r i c e s  f o r  b u t t e r  and s k i m  m i l k  powder 
a r e  s u p p o r t e d  by  an o f f e r - t o - p u r c h a s e  program. 
6 ~ h e  Canadian D a i r y  Commission A c t  r e g u l a t e s  a l l  i n d u s t r i a l  m i l k  and 
m i l k  p r o d u c t s ,  and under  i t  t h e  commission makes payments and 
u n d e r t a k e s  p r o m o t i  on, e t c .  
D u r i n g  1973-75 t h e r e  was a  consumer s u b s i d y  on f l u i d  
m i l k  o f  54 /q t  and t h e  s k i m  m i l k  powder s u b s i d y  was 
i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  20 t o  344 / l  b. 
A  p r o d u c e r  s u b s i d y  o f  $6.04/hl i s  p a i d  d i r e c t l y  t o  
i n d u s t r i a l  m i l k  p roducers ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  p r i c e  
r e c e i v e d  i n  t h e  m a r k e t  p lace .  Each p r o d u c e r  r e c e i v e s  as  
a  minimum t h e  f o r m u l a  ( o r  t a r g e t  r e t u r n )  p r i c e  f o r  m i l k  
produced w i t h i n  h i s  quota .  
( c )  Trade P o l i c i e s  
I m p o r t s  o f  d a i r y  p r o d u c t s  a r e  l i m i t e d  under  t h e  E x p o r t  
and I m p o r t  P e r m i t s  Act .  A  q u o t a  f o r  i m p o r t s  o f  
s p e c i a l t y  cheese was s e t  a t  22.7 thousand tons.7 
O r i g i n a l l y  cheese q u o t a s  were t o  r i s e  s o  as t o  r e s t r i c t  
i m p o r t s  t o  25 p e r c e n t  o f  domes t i c  consumpt ion,  b u t  
s u b s e q u e n t l y  reduced t o  c u r r e n t  1  eve1 s. B u t t e r  i s  
i m p o r t e d  when domes t i c  s h o r t a g e s  occur .  
T a r i f f s  on cheese a r e  3.04/lb.8 F o r  b u t t e r  t a r i f f s  
a r e  8 4 / l b  f o r  BP and 1 2 4 / l b  f o r  MFN. I n  g e n e r a l  t a r i f f s  
r e p r e s e n t  abou t  a  f i v e  p e r c e n t  ad va lo rem p r o t e c t i o n .  
S u r p l u s  s k i m  mi 1  k  powder and o c c a s i o n a l  b u t t e r  s u r p l  uses 
a r e  e x p o r t e d  a t  w o r l d  p r i c e s ,  f i n a n c e d  by  a  p r o d u c e r  
1  evy. 
7 ~ s  i m p o r t s  o f  cheese i n c r e a s e d  under  t h e  E x p o r t  and I m p o r t  P e r m i t s  
Ac t ,  Canada imposed a  q u o t a  o f  50 m i l  1. 1  b. i n  1975, w h i c h  was 
reduced t o  45 m i l l .  1  b. i n  1978. 
8 ~ a r i f f s  f o r  cheeses o t h e r  t h a n  cheddar  i s  3.54/lb. Oceanic 
c o u n t r i e s  have p r e f e r e n t i a l  r a t e s  o f  l $ / l b  f o r  cheese, 5 4 / l b  f o r  
b u t t e r  and l $ / l b .  f o r  m i l k  powder. T a r i f f s  p r o v i d e d  abou t  a  f i v e  
p e r c e n t  ad va lo rem p r o t e c t i o n  i n  1977. 
( d )  S tocks  
B o t h  p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e  s t o c k s  e x i s t  and p e r i o d i c a l l y  
t h e s e  may be s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  s k i m  m i l k  powder and 
b u t t e r .  As t h e s e  s t o c k s  i n c r e a s e ,  p r o d u c t i o n  quo tas  f o r  
i n d u s t r i a l  m i l k  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
p e r i o d s .  
3.2.6 O the r  meats (po rk ,  p o u l t r y  and f i s h )  
( a )  General Pol  i c i e s 1 I n s t i  t u t i o n s  
Q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  m a r k e t i n g  s t r u c t u r e s  e x i s t  f o r  each o f  
t h e s e  p roduc ts .  Market  p o l i c i e s  f o r  p o r k  a r e  s i m i l a r  t o  
t h o s e  f o r  b e e f ,  w h i l e  t h o s e  f o r  p o u l t r y  and eggs have 
e v o l v e d  t o  a  s t r u c t u r e  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  f o r  d a i r y  
p r o d u c t s .  
( b )  P r i c i n g  P o l i c i e s  
F o r  po rk ,  p r i c e s  a r e  s e t  i n  w o r l d  marke ts  and a r e  
a f fec ted ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  by supp ly ldemand f o r c e s  i n  
N o r t h  America. Canada s w i t c h e d  f r o m  a  n e t  e x p o r t e r  t o  a  
n e t  i m p o r t e r  i n  1974-77 and t h e n  t o  a  l a r g e  e x p o r t e r  
aga in .  S t a b i l i z a t i o n  payments were made t o  p o r k  
p r o d u c e r s  i n  1971/72 ($10.5 m i l l . )  
Egg p r i c i n g  e v o l  ved t o  a  c o s t - o f - p r o d u c t i o n  p r i c i n g  
f o r m u l a  d u r i n g  t h e  19701s,  w i t h  a  n a t i o n a l  agency, t h e  
Canadian Egg M a r k e t i n g  Agency, and p r o v i n c i a l  boards  
s e t t i n g  m o n t h l y  p r o d u c e r  p r i c e s  and p u r c h a s i n g  s u r p l u s  
s t o c k s  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e s e  p r i c e s .  S i m i l a r  s t r u c t u r e s  
e x i s t  f o r  t u r k e y  and c h i c k e n  b r o i l e r s ,  b u t  p r i c e s  a r e  
n o t  s o l e l y  de te rm ined  t h r o u g h  fo rmu lae .  
F i s h  p r i c e s  a r e  p r i m a r i l y  d e t e r m i n e d  i n  t h e  U.S. marke t ,  
where t h e  b u l k  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  expor ted .  
( c )  Trade P o l i c i e s  
Most  p o r k  t r a d e s  w i t h  a  0.5C/lb. ( $ 1 1 / t )  t a r i f f  and a  15 
p e r c e n t  t a r i f f  on canned p roduc ts .  H e a l t h  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
a1 so p r e v e n t  i m p o r t s  f r o m  a  number o f  c o u n t r i e s .  
P o u l t r y  and egg p r o d u c t s  have q u o t a s  on i m p o r t s .  F o r  
c h i c k e n ,  i m p o r t s  a r e  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  s i x  p e r c e n t  o f  
domes t i c  p r o d u c t i o n .  Supplemental  i m p o r t s  a r e  g r a n t e d  
if s h o r t a g e s  occu r .  S u r p l u s  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  s o l d  i n  e x p o r t  
marke ts .  T a r i f f s  f o r  p o u l t r y  a r e  12  p e r c e n t  (10$ / lb .  
maximum) and eggs 2@/dozen MFN. 
The 200 m i l e  f i s h i n g  1  i m i t  has i n c r e a s e d  1  eve1 s  o f  
p r o d u c t i o n  f o r  Canadian f ishermen.  
( d )  S tocks  
F o r  p o r k ,  s t o c k s  a r e  h e l d  p r i v a t e l y  and t h e s e  a r e  
i m p o r t a n t  f o r  s h o r t - r u n  p r i c e  movements, b u t  t h e s e  
e f f e c t s  d e c l i n e  on an annual  b a s i s .  
F o r  p o u l t r y  and eggs, s t o c k s  p r o v i d e  t h e  ' m a j o r  s i g n a l s  
t o  m o d i f y  quo ta  l e v e l s  i n  subsequent p e r i o d s .  
3.2.7 P r o t e i n  feeds  
( a )  General Pol i c i e s / I n s t i  t u t i o n s  
O i  1  seed c r o p s  domina te  t h i s  market .  I n  t h e  P r a i r i e s ,  
rapeseed has become t h e  p r i n c i p a l  o i l s e e d  c r o p  d u r i n g  
t h e  1960 's  and 19701s,  t h e  p r o d u c t  i s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
improved  and n o t e d  b y  a  new name, Canolag. Most o f  
Canadian e x p o r t s  a r e  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  seed, n o t  o i l  and 
meal p r o d u c t s .  Most o i l  e x p o r t s  have g e n e r a l l y  been i n  
t h e  form o f  f o o d  a id .  
( b )  P r i c i n g  Pol  i c i e s  
P r i c e s  f o r  Canadian o i l s e e d s  and p r o t e i n  f e e d  a r e  
e s s e n t i a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  on a  w o r l d  o i l s e e d  marke t  b a s i s ,  
a l t h o u g h  soybean meal commands a  premium o v e r  rapeseed 
meal. U n l i k e  wheat and coa rse  g r a i n s ,  however, Canadian 
p r o d u c e r s  do  n o t  r e c e i v e  a  guaran teed  minimum p r i c e .  
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  c o n s t r a i n t s  have caused some p r i c i n g  
anoma l ies  between farms and e x p o r t  p o i n t s  and some farm 
s t o c k  accumul a t i o n s .  The C.W.B. s e t s  d e l i v e r y  q u o t a s  
f o r  rapeseed and f l a x s e e d  t o  a l l o c a t e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and 
s t o r a g e  f a c i  1  i t i e s  among g r a i n s .  
Trade Pol i c i  es  
There  a r e  no t a r i f f s  o r  quo tas  on o i l s e e d ,  meal o r  c r u d e  
o i l .  W h i l e  Canada i m p o r t s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p r o t e i n  feed,  i t  
i s  a  n e t  e x p o r t e r .  
9 ~ a n o l a  o i l  i s  s u b s t a n t i a l  l y  l o w e r  i n  e r u c i c  a c i d  and Canola meal i s  
much 1  ower i n  g l  u c o s i  n a l  a t e  and f i b r e  c o n t e n t .  
( d )  Stocks 
Stocks a r e  h e l d  b o t h  by producers  and i n  commercial 
p o s i t i o n s .  I n  Western Canada, m a r k e t i n g  quo tas  e x i s t  f o r  
rapeseed, and excess s u p p l i e s  a r e  s t o r e d  i n  farms. The 
l e v e l  o f  fa rmer  h e l d  s t o c k s  w i l l  a f f e c t  acreage 
a l l o c a t e d  t o  o i l s e e d s  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c r o p  y e a r .  F o r  
example, when s t o c k s  i n c r e a s e d  160 p e r c e n t  t o  1.04 
m i l l i o n  t i n  1976, t h i s  r e s u l t e d  i n  an acreage r e d u c t i o n  
t o  l e s s  t h a n  one-ha1 f t h e  p r e v i o u s  f i v e - y e a r  average. 
Very l i m i t e d  s t o c k s  a r e  h e l d  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  p r o t e i n  
feed, b u t  m a i n l y  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  seed. 
3.2.8 Other food  
It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h i s  ca tegory .  The 
m a j o r i t y  o f  p r o d u c t s  t r a d e  w i t h  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  o r  z e r o  
t a r i f f s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  on raw commodit ies) .  Some o f  t h e  
h o r t i c u l t u r a l  c rops  have h i g h e r  p r o t e c t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
" in -season"  f r e s h  p roduc ts .  The m a j o r i  t y  o f  domest ic  
consumpt ion o f  f r u i t s  (about  50 p e r c e n t ) ,  sugar  and 
p l a n t a t i o n  c r o p s  a r e  imported.  
S t a b i l i z a t i o n  payments have been i m p o r t a n t  f o r  some o f  
t h e  h o r t i c u l t u r a l  c r o p s  and sugar  beets.10 Exc ise  
t a x e s  a r e  a  b a r r i e r  t o  consumpt ion o f  i m p o r t e d  a l c o h o l i c  
beverages. 
l 0 ~ o r  18 y e a r s ,  1958-76 A g r i c u l t u r a l  S t a b i l  i z a t i o n  payments 
c o n t r i b u t e d  0.09 p e r c e n t  o f  t o t a l  r e c e i p t s  f o r  t h e  h o r t i c u l t u r e  
s e c t o r  and 0.22 p e r c e n t  f o r  a1 1  f i e l d  crops.  
3.2.9 Nonfood a g r i c u l t u r e  
T a r i f f s  a r e  t h e  ma in  t r a d e  b a r r i e r  f o r  t h e s e  p roduc ts ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  tobacco.  H ides and s k i n s  a r e  f r e e .  
P r o d u c t s  i n  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  a r e  h i g h l y  processed,  
c r e a t i n g  w i d e l y  d i f f e r e n t  p r o d u c t s  between t r a d e d  and 
d o m e s t i c a l l y  consumed goods. 
3.2.10 Nonagr i cu l  t u r e  
A  m i x  o f  t a r i f f  and o t h e r  t r a d e  r e s t r a i n t  measures a r e  
used. Many o f  t h e  goods a r e  n o t  t r a d e d  (e.g., 
hous ing,  s e r v i c e s ) .  
3.3. . New Pol  i c y  Devel opments 
I n  1981, Canada i n t r o d u c e d  an A g r i  f ood  S t r a t e g y  (Chal  1  enge 
f o r  Growth),  w h i c h  o u t l i n e s  t h e  genera l  t y p e s  o f  p o l i c i e s  
r e q u i r e d  t o  c a p i t a l i z e  on t h e  expec ted  g r o w t h  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
i n  b o t h  d o m e s t i c  and w o r l d  marke ts  f o r  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  
decade. The g r o w t h - o r i e n t e d  s t r a t e g y  focuses  on t h e  t h r e e  
a r e a s  o f  m a r k e t  development,  improvements i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  and expand ing m i s s i o n - o r i e n t e d  research.  Key 
e lemen ts  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  a r e  t o  expand p r o c e s s i n g  and s a l e s  o f  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s ,  t o  d e v e l o p  t h e  b a s i c  p r o d u c t i o n  
r e s o u r c e s ,  t o  m i n i m i z e  r i s k s  t o  p roducers  and t o  a c c e l e r a t e  
a p p l i e d  r e s e a r c h  and i t s  commercia l  a p p l i c a t i o n .  An 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  e x p o r t  t r a d i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n  Canagrex has been 
e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  a s s i s t  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t r a t e g y .  
I n  te rms o f  new p o l i c y  d i r e c t i o n s  f o r  b e e f ,  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  
b e i n g  g i v e n  t o  i n s t i t u t i n g  a  new s t a b i l i z a t i o n  program t o  
o f f s e t  t h e  i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  p r i c e s  and p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  beef 
i n d u s t r y .  
The domes t i c  f e e d g r a i n s  p o l i c y  i s  now u n d e r  rev iew .  No 
change i s  1  i k e l y  t h a t  wou ld  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  e x p o r t s ,  b u t  
r e g i o n a l  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  f o r  g r a i n s  and hence 1  i v e s t o c k  
p r o d u c t i  on may be a f f e c t e d .  
The domes t i c  d a i r y  and p o u l t r y  p o l i c i e s  a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  
change s u b s t a n t i a l l y .  A r e c e n t  r e v i e w  o f  d a i r y  p o l i c y  
r e s u l t e d  i n  no b a s i c  change i n  t h e  p o l i c y .  Some r e g i o n a l  
r e a l l o c a t i o n s  o f  q u o t a  may o c c u r  r e f l e c t i n g  s h i f t s  i n  demand 
and p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s .  
The h o r t i c u l t u r a l  i n d u s t r y  may be  a  m a j o r  b e n e f a c t o r  o f  t h e  
a g r i - f o o d  s t r a t e g y  t h r o u g h  i n c r e a s e d  s u p p o r t  f o r  p rocess ing ,  
s t o r a g e  and s a l e s .  
Changes i n  t h e  Crow's  Nest  Pass F r e i g h t  Rates  a r e  b e i n g  
deba ted  and t h i s  w i l l  1  i k e l y  i n v o l v e  some i n c r e a s e  i n  c o s t s  
p a i d  b y  producers .  The l a t e s t  p roposa l  i s  t h a t  some f u t u r e  
i n c r e a s e s  wou ld  be  p a i d  b y  p r o d u c e r s  b u t  most  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  
d e f i c i t  between t h e  r a i l r o a d ' s  c o s t s  and revenue wou ld  be  
p a i d  by  t h e  f e d e r a l  government d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  r a i l r o a d s .  
If governments m a i n t a i n  a  t i g h t  f i s c a l  p o l i c y ,  i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  
t h a t  any o t h e r  new p o l i c i e s  w i l l  b e  i n t r o d u c e d  wh ich  i n v o l v e  
l a r g e  d i r e c t  payments t o  p roducers .  T h i s  wou ld  i m p l y  t h a t  
t h e  use  o f  q u a l i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  may become more i m p o r t a n t  
a s  a  means o f  s u p p o r t  t o  p roducers .  
4. IMPACT OF TRADE POLICY ON DOMESTIC AND WORLD P R I C E  RELATIONSHIPS 
4.1 Theo re t i ca l  Cons idera t ions  
The purpose of  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  t o  assess whether o r  n o t  a  
s imp le  model i s  use fu l  t o  examine and q u a n t i f y  t h e  n a t u r e  and 
t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t r a d e  p r o t e c t i o n  e f f e c t s  i n s t i t u t e d  by Canada 
f o r  t h e  n i n e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  commodit ies. I f  so, can t h i s  
s imp le  model be used t o  r ep resen t  w o r l d  p r i c e s  i n  t h e  
domest ic  market? Trade p r o t e c t i o n  a f f e c t s  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  a r e  
cons idered  t o  r e s u l t  n o t  o n l y  f rom t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  as t a r i f f s  
and quotas,  and t h e  n o n t a r i f f  b a r r i e r s  such as r e g u l a t i o n s ,  
b u t  a l s o  f rom n a t u r a l  b a r r i e r s  such as t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and 
o t h e r  ma rke t i ng  charges. As w e l l  ad justments  f o r  q u a l i t y  
d i f f e rences  between domest ic and f o r e i g n  p roduc ts  must be 
made i n  t h e  assessment o f  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  e f f e c t s .  
The i n t e n t  i s  t o  s p e c i f y  a  s imp le  model which r ep resen t s  t h e  
nominal t r a d e  p r o t e c t i o n  e f f e c t  a r i s i n g  f rom these  f a c t o r s  as 
a  p r i c e  wedge between t h e  domest ic  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  markets. 
If t h e  n a t u r e  and magnitude o f  t h i s  wedge appears c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  t h e  above p o l i c y  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  each commodity market,  
t h e n  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  may be used t o  r ep resen t  w o r l d  p r i c e s  
i n  Canada. 
The BLS i s  a  genera l  e q u i l i b r i u m  model. Fo r  purposes of 
i 11 u s t r a t i o n  and ease o f  exp lana t i on ,  however, t h e  examples 
and most o f  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  a b s t r a c t s  f rom t h e  
genera l  e q u i l i b r i u m  concepts  and uses s i m p l e r  p a r t i a l  
equ i  1  i b r i  urn model s. 
To examine t h e  n a t u r e  o f  p r o t e c t i o n ,  one can use  t h e  w e l l  
known p r i c e  e q u i l i b r i u m  model. For t h e  case  o f  one good and 
t w o  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  s u p p l y  demand and p r i c e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  
shown f o r  c o u n t r y  A  ( F i g u r e  1  a ) ,  c o u n t r y  B  ( F i g u r e  1  b )  and 
t h e i r  n e t  t r a d e  f u n c t i o n s  ( F i g u r e  I c ) .  T h i s  shows t h a t  under  
p e r f e c t  marke t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  p r i c e s  a r e  equa l  i n  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s  
( P A  = PB = PN) and e x p o r t s  o f  c o u n t r y  B  a r e  equa l  
t o  t h e  i m p o r t s  i n t o  c o u n t r y  A  o f  NT. 
I f  an i m p o r t  t a r i f f  o r  a  t r a n s p o r t  c o s t  o f  K i s  now 
i n t r o d u c e d ,  t h i s  s h i f t s  t h e  excess demand i n  C o ~ ~ n t r y  B, t o  
ES' , a  r e d u c t i o n  o f  K. The p r i c e  i n  Coun t ry  A  i s  now h i g h e r  
t h a n  i n  Count ry  B and t r a d e ,  NT', i s  s m a l l e r .  
If t h e  t a r i f f  was p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  p r i c e  (ad  va lorem) ,  t h e n  K 
c o u l d  be  expressed as  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  P and ES' would have a  
smal l e r  s l  ope. 
I f  K were s u f f i c i e n t l y  h i g h ,  no t r a d e  would t a k e  p l a c e  and 
t h e  p r i c e  r e 1  a t i o n s h i p  between c o u n t r i e s  would be 
i nde te rm i  nate .  
A  p roducer  s u b s i d y  o r  consumer t a x  (S )  c o u l d  have a  s i m i l a r ,  
b u t  o p p o s i t e  impac t  o f  l o w e r i n g  ES b y  S  u n i t s .  
Quotas on i m p o r t s ,  e x p o r t s  o r  p r o d u c t i o n  wou ld  have t h e  
e f f e c t  o f  i n t r o d u c i n g  a  " k i n k "  i n  t h e  n e t  t r a d e  f u n c t i o n .  For  
example, an i m p o r t  q u o t a  by c o u n t r y  A  wou ld  c r e a t e  a  
p e r f e c t l y  i n e l a s t i c  excess demand a t  t h a t  p o i n t .  Obv ious l y ,  

t h e  q u o t a  wou ld  n o t  be e f f e c t i v e  i f  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t  o f  
t h e  n e t  t r a d e  f u n c t i o n s  were l e s s  t h a n  t h e  quota.  If t h e  
q u o t a  were e f f e c t i v e ,  and e q u a l l e d  NT' ,  p r i c e  i n  Coun t ry  A  
wou ld  rema in  a t  P ' A .  The p r i c e  i n  Coun t ry  B  c o u l d  
c o n t i n u e  t o  d e c l i n e  i f  i t s  excess s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n  s h i f t e d  t o  
t h e  r i g h t .  E x p o r t  o r  p r o d u c t i o n  q u o t a s  c o u l d  be m o d e l l e d  i n  
a  s i m i l a r  f a s h i o n .  
4.2 P r o ~ o s e d  Model 
If a l l  p o l i c y ,  r e g u l a t i o n s  o r  o t h e r  p r o t e c t i o n  can be r e p r e -  
s e n t e d  as  nomina l  t a r i f f  e q u i v a l e n t s ,  t h e n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between domes t i c  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e s  may i n d i c a t e  t h e  
n a t u r e  and l e v e l  o f  p r o t e c t i o n 1  
.Suppose a  r e g r e s s i o n  were 
c a l c u l a t e d  as f o l  1  ows : 
L e t  C o u n t r y  B  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d ,  and e  i s  t h e  
exchange r a t e .  PA and PB a r e  d e f i n e d  above and a,  b  
a r e  pa ramete rs  t o  be e s t i m a t e d  
( i )  Case 1 
i f a = O , b = l  
T h i s  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  p e r f e c t  m a r k e t ,  f r e e  t r a d e  
s i t u a t i o n ,  w i t h  n o  t r a n s f e r  c o s t s .  
( i i )  Case 2 
i f a = O , b = O  
T h i s  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  t a r i f f  e q u i v a l e n t  e f f e c t  o f  a  
b i n d i n g  quo ta ,  where p r i c e  i n  c o u n t r y  A  bears  no 
d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  p r i c e  i n  c o u n t r y  B, assuming 
no changes i n  excess s u p p l y  o r  demand f u n c t i o n s .  
l ~ h i s  assumes t h a t  p r o t e c t i o n  on i n p u t s  i s  s m a l l  and /o r  value-added 
i s  l a r g e  so t h a t  nomina l  and e f f e c t i v e  p r o t e c t i o n  i s  s i m i l a r .  
( i i i  ) Case 3  
i f a f O , b = l  
T h i s  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  case o f  a  s p e c i f i c  t a r i f f  ( a )  o r  
f i x e d  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  cos t .  
( i v )  Case 4 
i f  a  = 0, b  = ( 1  + K )  
T h i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  t h e  ad va lorem t a r i f f  which i s  
equa l  t o  K. 
I n  most cases, commodi t ies  w i l l  be a f f e c t e d  by a  m ix  of 
p o l i c i e s ,  n a t u r a l  p r o t e c t i o n  and qua1 i t y  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  wak ing 
i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a t t r i b u t e  t h e  " p r o t e c t i o n "  e f f e c t  t o  any one 
i nd i  v i  dua l  e l  ement. 
The model p roposed i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 )  was e s t i m a t e d  u s i n g  t h e  
I I A S A  Canadian commodity p r i c e  da ta  f o r  PA and w o r l d  
commodity p r i c e  d a t a  f o r  PB. A second v a r i a t i o n  o f  ( 3 )  
was t h e  use o f  t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  d a t a  l agged  one p e r i o d .  Ua ta  
were f o r  t h e  1961-76 p e r i o d .  The o b j e c t i v e  was t o  t e s t  
whe the r  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  c o e f f i c i  en ts ,  based on t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i n  t h e  above f o u r  cases were c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
t h e  e x i s t i q g  p o l i c i e s  i n  Canada. 
4.3 E m ~ i r i c a l  R e s u l t s  
R e s u l t s  o f  t h e  e s t i m a t i o n  o f  E q u a t i o n  ( 3 )  a r e  shown f o r  t h e  
cases o f  c u r r e n t  w o r l d  p r i c e s  i n  T a b l e  4.1 and f o r  l agged  
w o r l d  p r i c e s  i n  T a b l e  4.2. Us ing c u r r e n t  w o r l d  p r i c e s  f o r  
wheat, c o a r s e  g r a i n s  and nonfood,  t h e  i n t e r c e p t  was n o t  
2 ~ a c h  model was e s t i m a t e d  b o t h  w i t h  and w i t h o u t  i n t e r c e p t s ,  b u t  t h e  
l a t t e r  d i d  n o t  p r o v i d e  r e s u l t s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  as good as t h o s e  w i t h  
i n t e r c e p t s .  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  z e r o  n o r  t h e  p r i c e  c o e f f i c i e n t  
d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  one. T h i s  i s  t h e  f r e e  t r a d e  and z e r o  t r a n s f e r  
c o s t  s i t u a t i o n ,  w h i c h  wou ld  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e s e  
commodi t ies ,  s i n c e  Canada i s  a  n e t  e x p o r t e r .  I n  two cases,  
b e e f  and o t h e r  meats, t h e  i n t e r c e p t  was ze ro ,  w h i l e  t h e  p r i c e  
c o e f f i c i e n t  was much g r e a t e r  t h a n  one. T h i s  i m p l i e s  a  l a r g e  
ad va lo rem t a r i f f ,  wh ich  i s  n o t  t h e  p o l i c y  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  
e i t h e r  commodity. T h i s  i s  p r o b a b l y  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a  q u a l i t y  
premium. I n  t h e  case o f  d a i r y ,  t h e  i n t e r c e p t  was l a r g e r  t h a n  
zero ,  b u t  t h e  p r i c e  c o e f f i c i e n t  was a p p r o x i m a t e l y  one. T h i s  
i m p l  i e s  a f i x e d  t a r i f f ,  w h i c h  a g a i n  i s  n o t  t h e  main  p o l i c y  
t o o l  f o r  d a i r y .  I n  t h e  cases o f  p r o t e i n  f e e d  and o t h e r  
food,  t h e  i n t e r c e p t s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  z e r o  and t h e  p r i c e  
c o e f f i c i e n t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  one. The p o l i c y  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
o f  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  i n  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  p o l i c i e s .  
I n  T a b l e  4.2, u s i n g  l agged  w o r l d  p r i c e s ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  a r e  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  i n  T a b l e  4.1 e x c e p t  f o r  d a i r y ,  w h i c h  i n  t h i s  
case i m p l  i e s  a  t a r i f f  r e s t r a i n t .  Model r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e  
r e 1  a t i  v e l y  good s t a t i s t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  w i t h  most  R2 
v a l u e s  between 0.7 and 0.9. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i n  most  cases,  i t  was n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  use  t h e  
r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h i s  s i m p l e  model t o  i n t e r p r e t  e q u i v a l e n t  t a r i f f  
o r  quo ta  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  commodi t ies  i n  Canada. R e s u l t s  were 
a c c e p t a b l e  f o r  homogeneous cornmodi t ies i n  w h i c h  Canada was a  
1  a r g e  f r e e  t r a d e r .  The d a t a  prob lems n o t e d  i n  S e c t i o n  2.2 
may a1 so be a  f a c t o r  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  r e s u l t s .  
TABLE 4.1. ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS RELATING DOMESTIC CANADIAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL PRICES, 1961-76 
Pr i ce R2 
Commod i t y  I n t e r c e p t  C o e f f i c i e n t  (DW S t a t )  
Wheat 
Coarse g r a i n s  
Bov ine  
Da i r y  
O ther  meat 
P r o t e i n  feeds 
Other  f o o d  
Non food  a g r i c .  
Model used was shown i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 )  
a s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  1.0 ( s t a n d a r d  e r r o r s  a r e  shown i n  
b r a c k e t s ) .  
b s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  0. 
TABLE 4.2. ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS RELATING DOMESTIC CANADIAN PRICES 
TO LAGGED INTERNATIONAL PRICES, 1961-76 
P r i c e  R 2 
Cornmod i t y  I n t e r c e p t  C o e f f i c i e n t  (DW S t a t )  
Wheat 
Coarse g r a i  ns 
B o v i n e  
Da i ry 
O t h e r  meat 
P r o t e i n  feeds 
O t h e r  f o o d  
Non f o o d  a g r i c .  
Model used was shown i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 )  u s i n g  one p e r i o d  l a g  on w o r l d  
p r i c e s .  
a s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom 0 ( s t a n d a r d  e r r o r s  a r e  shown i n  
b r a c k e t s ) .  
b s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  1.0. 
5. APPLICATION OF BLS POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR CANADA 
P o l i c y  I n s t r u m e n t s  i n  t h e  BLS 
The BLS was deve loped t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  m a j o r  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s  
commonly used by  n a t i o n a l  governments i n  o r d e r  t o  pursue 
commodity m a r k e t  p o l i c i e s .  These i n c l u d e  t h o s e  p o l i c i e s  
w h i c h  d i r e c t l y  i n f l u e n c e  marke t  p r i c e s ,  - l e v e l  o f  s t o c k s  and 
volume o f  e x p o r t s  and i m p o r t s .  I n  t h e  BLS, t h o s e  p o l i c i e s  
a r e  i n t r o d u c e d  o n l y  i n  a  v e r y  s p e c i f i c  manner. 
I n  t h e  BLS, a  p r i c e  p o l i c y  can be pursued t h r o u g h  a  t a r i f f ,  
s u b s i d y  o r  taxes .  A  b u f f e r  s t o c k  can be pursued t h r o u g h  t h e  
o p e r a t i o n  o f  a  p u b l i c  b u f f e r  s t o c k  agency wh ich  announces 
t h a t  i t  w i l l  buy and s e l l  u n l i m i t e d  q u a n t i t i e s  a t  quoted 
p r i c e s .  A  t r a d e  p o l i c y  can p r i m a r i l y  be  i n t r o d u c e d  by t h e  
i m p o s i t i o n  o f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  c o n s t r a i n t s  (quo tas )  on n e t  
i m p o r t s  . 
I n  t h e  exchange module o f  t h e  BLS, each commodity i n  each 
c o u n t r y  i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  as a  homogeneous o f  degree z e r o  excess 
demand (ED) f u n c t i o n ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  no p o l  i c y  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
( i  .e., none o f  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t s  a r e  a t  t h e i  r bounds). I n  
s e t t i n g  v a l u e s  o f  p o l i c y  parameters,  c o u n t r i e s  o n l y  have 
i n f o r m a t i o n  abou t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  w o r l d  p r i c e s  (PW), t h e i r  own 
n e t  t r a d e  ( E )  and o t h e r  domes t i c  marke t  v a r i a b l e s  (e.g., 
s u p p l y  s t o c k s )  ( F i g u r e  2 ) .  There i s  no  i n f o r m a t i o n  about  
p o l i c y  a c t i o n s  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  o t h e r  t h a n  what can be 
o b t a i n e d  f r o m  t h e  impact  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r y  p o l i c i e s  on w o r l d  
p r i c e s  and t r a d e .  I n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  parameter  l e v e l s  o f  
p o l  i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  t h e y  respond t o  w o r l d  
p r i c e s ,  domes t i c  p r o d u c t i o n  and t h e  p r e v i o u s  p e r i o d ' s  t r a d e  
and s t o c k s .  





















EC p r  
A 
E'  





It s h o u l d  be n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s  i n  t h e  BLS 
must be ranked a c c o r d i n g  t o  p r i o r i t y  i n  wh ich  t h e y  opera te .  
I n  d e s c r i b i n g  t h i s  rank ing ,  Keyzer (1981) uses t h e  n o t a t i o n  
d e s c r i b e d  be low and i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F i g u r e s  3 and 4. 
i s  a  t a r g e t  v a l u e  f o r  p o l i c y  v a r i a b l e  x  (any 
v a r i a b l e  can become a  p o l  i c y  v a r i a b l e ) .  
a r e  t h e  upper  and l o w e r  bounds f o r  x. 
i s  a  weak ad jus tmen t  r u l e .  
T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a s  l o n g  as  v a r i a b l e  y i s  a d j u s t e d  
w i t h i n  i t s  bounds, x  remains a t  i t s  t a r g e t .  I f  y 
reaches a  bound t h e n  x  i s  a d j u s t e d ,  b u t  t h e  
d i r e c t i o n  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  i s  n o t  f i x e d  ( a s  shown i n  
F i g u r e  4) .  
p o s i t i v e  a d j u s t m e n t  r u l e .  
I f  y reaches i t s  upper  ( l o w e r )  bound, t h e n  x  i s  
a d j u s t e d  upward (downward) (as  shown i n  F i g u r e  4) .  
n e g a t i v e  a d j u s t m e n t  r u l e .  
I f  y reaches i t s  upper ( l o w e r )  bound, t h e n  x  i s  
a d j u s t e d  downward (upward) ( a s  shown i n  F i g u r e  4). 
5.1.1 C o n d i t i o n s  f o r  s e t t i n g  t h e  p o l i c y  response f u n c t i o n s  
The f o l l o w i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  must  be met f o r  s e t t i n g  
v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  p o l i c y  v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  BLS. 
1 )  The r a n k i n g  o f  t h e  p o l  i c y  v a r i a b l e s  must  be 
c o n s i s t e n t  a c r o s s  a l l  commodi t ies.  The p r e s e n t  
program s p e c i f i e s  t h a t  t h e  r a n k i n g  i s  P r i c e  - + 
Stocks  - - P r i c e  - Trade. It i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  
r e l a x  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n .  
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2 )  The p o l  i c y  response f u n c t i o n s  cannot  have a s  
arguments,  v a r i a b l e s  wh ich  a r e  c u r r e n t  endogenous 
v a r i a b l e s  t o  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  exchange e x c e p t  f o r  
t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  and t h e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t .  
3 )  A1 1 q u a n t i t y  t a r g e t s  and bounds must  be 
homogeneous o f  degree z e r o  i n  w o r l d  p r i c e  and 
t r a d e  d e f i c i t .  If a l l  t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e s  and t h e  
t r a d e  d e f i c i t  were m u l t i p l i e d  b y  a  f a c t o r  t h e r e  
wou ld  be no change i n  t h e  q u a n t i t y  t a r g e t .  For  
example t h e  s t o c k  t a r g e t  f u n c t i o n  s h o u l d  s a t i s f y  
where i s  t h e  s t o c k  t a r g e t  v a r i a b l e  (e.g., 
t r a d e  t a r g e t ,  o r  s t o c k  t a r g e t )  
PW i s  t h e  w o r l d  market  p r i c e ,  
K i s  t h e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t ,  
and x i s  a  r e a l  c o n s t a n t .  
4 )  The p r i c e  t a r g e t s  and bounds must be homothe t i c  i n  
w o r l d  p r i c e s  and t r a d e  d e f i c i t .  I f  a l l  t h e  w o r l d  
p r i c e s  and t h e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  were m u l t i p l i e d  b y  a  
f a c t o r  t h e  p r i c e  t a r g e t s  wou ld  change s c a l e  b y  a  
f u n c t i o n  o f  t h a t  f a c t o r .  
where P i s  t h e  p r i c e  t a r g e t  
and N( x ) i s  a  p o s i t i v e  f u n c t i o n  o f  
and a l l  o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  as d e f i n e d  above. 
5 )  A1 1  o f  t h e  p o l  i c y  response f u n c t i o n s  a r e  
c o n t i n u o u s  f u n c t i o n s .  
6) The f u n c t i o n s  must be such t h a t  t h e  upper  bound i s  
g r e a t e r  t h a n  i t s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t a r g e t  and t h e  
t a r g e t  must  be g r e a t e r  t h a n  i t s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
1  ower bound. 
7 )  The t r a d e  t a r g e t s  must be c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  
t r a d e  d e f i c i t .  The t r a d e  d e f i c i t  must  1  i e  between 
t h e  t o t a l  v a l u e  o f  n e t  t r a d e  a t  t h e  l o w e r  and 
upper  t r a d e  bounds. 
where z i s  t h e  v e c t o r  o f  l o w e r  bounds f o r  t r a d e  
- 
and 5 i s  t h e  v e c t o r  o f  upper  bounds f o r  
t r a d e  and a l l  o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  a s  p r e v i o u s l y  
d e f  i ned. 
8 )  The s t o c k  and t r a d e  t a r g e t s  a r e  such t h a t  t h e  
minimum domes t i c  consumpt ion  i s  p o s i t i v e  
- 
i ( p W , ~ ) <  L ~ j ~ - ~  + w t - ~  +z(PW,K) - 
where i s  ?he upper  bound f o r  s tocks .  
2 Pol i c y  v a r i a b l e s ,  t a r g e t s  and bounds 
I n  t h e  c u r r e n t  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  BLS, t h e r e  a r e  f i v e  i m p l i c i t  
p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  t h r e e  o f  t h e s e  a r e  commodity p o l i c i e s  - 
domes t i c  p r i c e s ,  n e t  t r a d e  volume, s t o c k  l e v e l s  - and two  
a r e  f i n a n c i a l  - t a x e s  and ba lance  o f  t r a d e .  For  each o f  
t h e s e  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  a  l o w e r  bound, t a r g e t  and an upper  bound 
need t o  be  s e t ,  a s  shown below. 
TABLE 5.0 POLICY INSTRUMENTS I N  THE BASIC LINK SYSTEMS 
Lower UP per  
Bound Ta r g e t  Bound 
- - 
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K Fi  nanc ia l  
For  each coun t r y ,  t h e  po l  i c y  b l ock  i n c l u d e s  va lues f o r  those  
15 v a r i a b l e s  e i t h e r  as cons tan ts ,  ac tua l  s ,  o r  as some 
f u n c t i o n  o f  o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  (e.g. PW). In  o rde r  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  r e a l i s t i c  va lues f o r  these  15 parameters,  a  
procedure i s  needed t o  s p e c i f y  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  po l  i c i e s  
acco rd i ng  t o  t h e  model ins t ruments ,  such as supp ly  c o n t r o l ,  
i m p o r t  t a r i f f s ,  etc., t h e i r  p r i o r i t y  r ank ing  and t h e  va lues 
o f  t h e  p o l i c y  t a r g e t s  and bounds i n  t h e  BLS. 
To e x p l a i n  how t h i s  approach i s  implemented, we t a k e  t h e  
example o f  a  s e t  o f  p o l i c i e s  f o r  a  s i n g l e  commodity - f o r  
example, wheat. We s p e c i f y  t a r g e t s  and bounds f o r  t h e  p r i c e  
as we l l  as t h e  n e t  expo r t s ,  as i 1  l u s t r a t e d  i n  F i gu re  3. The 
government would 1  i ke t h e  p r i c e  t o  have va lue  P  and expo r t s  
t o  have v a l u e  E, b u t  i t  wants a t  any r a t e  p r i c e  and expo r t  
combinat ions t o  be w i t h i n  t h e  quadr i  1  l e d  reg ion.  However, 
i t  f u r t h e r  r e s t r i c t s  t h e  outcome t o  t h e  heavy l i n e  i n  F i g u r e  
4 ( X  f o r  p r i c e ,  Y f o r  n e t  e x p o r t s ) ,  where, f o r  example, i n  
( b ) ,  t h e  p r i c e  should  be on t a r g e t  as l o n g  as n e t  e x p o r t  i s  
w i t h i n  bounds, and shou ld  n o t  be above t a r g e t  when t h e  n e t  
e x p o r t  i s  a t  i t s  upper bound and n o t  below t a r g e t  when t h e  
n e t  e x p o r t  i s  a t  i t s  l ower  bound. 
F i g u r e  4, ( a ) ,  ( b )  and ( c ) ,  d e s c r i b e s  i n  a  genera l  way 
a1 t e r n a t i  ve a d j u s t m e n t  r u l e s .  Again, t h e  heavy 1  i n e  
d e s c r i b e s  t h e  s e t  o f  outcomes wh ich  a r e  assumed t o  be 
a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  government. 
P o l i c y  v a r i a b l e  p r i o r i t y  r a n k i n g  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  c o r r e c t l y  
r e p r e s e n t  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s  used by 
po l i cymakers .  The f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  p r o v i d e s  f o u r  examples 
o f  p o l  i c y  r a n k i n g :  
( i )  P r i c e  -+Trade 
( i i )  Trade - -Pr ice  
( i i i )  S tocks  -+Pr ice  
( i v )  P r i c e  --Stocks 
These examples i 1  l u s t r a t e  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i n v o l v e d  i n  
p o l  i c y  v a r i a b l e  r a n k i n g .  
(i ) P r i c e  - Trade 
F o r  t h i s  r a n k i n g  o f  p o l i c y  v a r i a b l e s  t h e  domes t i c  
p o l i c y m a k e r  i s  assumed t o  have b o t h  a p r i c e  and a  
t r a d e  p o l i c y ;  however, t h e  p r i c e  p o l i c y  i s  more 
i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  t h e  t r a d e  p o l i c y .  I n  o t h e r  words,  he  
i s  w i l l i n g  t o  i n c r e a s e  i m p o r t s  o r  t o  g i v e  up a  
p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  e x p o r t  marke t  t o  keep t h e  domes t i c  
p r i c e  a t  i t s  t a r g e t  l e v e l .  The re fo re ,  t h e  p r i c e  
t a r g e t  i s  m a i n t a i n e d  w h i l e  t h e  t r a d e  v a r i e s  f rom i t s  
t a r g e t  u n t i l  one o f  t h e  t r a d e  bounds i s  h i t .  Then 
t h e  p r i c e  i s  a l l o w e d  t o  v a r y  f r o m  i t s  t a r g e t .  One 
example i s  t h a t  t h e  domes t i c  p r i c e  t a r g e t  i s  equa l  t o  
t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  and t r a d e  i s  a l l o w e d  t o  va ry .  I n  
F i g u r e  5, when t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  i s  WP1, t h e n  t h e  
domes t i c  p r i c e  would be DP1, and NT1 would  be  
t raded .  Now if t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  changed t o  WP2, 
t h e n  t h e  domes t i c  p r i c e  wou ld  a l s o  be DP2. 
FIGURE 5: EXCESS DEMAND FUNCTION FOR PRICE - @ TRADE 
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If we assume t h a t  t h e  p r i c e  t a r g e t  P  i s  a lways equal  
t o  t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  WP t h e n  we can examine t h i s  i n  
p o l i c y  space. N o t i c e  t h a t  we a r e  g r a p h i n g  domest ic  
p r i c e  and t r a d e  g i v e n  a  w o r l d  p r i c e .  F o r  t h i s  w o r l d  
p r i c e  t h e  domest ic  p r i c e  t a r g e t  i s  a t  P. Suppose t h a t  
t h e  government a l s o  s e t  a  n e t  t r a d e  t a r g e t  of 
5 and n e t  t r a d e  bounds o f  E and as shown i n  f i g u r e  6. 
- 
A l s o  suppose t h a t  E  i n  f i g u r e  8 i s  equal  t o  NT1 
- 
i n  f i g u r e  5 and 5 i s  equal  t o  NT2. As l o n g  as t r a d e  
i s  between NT1 (E)  and NT2 ( E )  t h e  domest ic  p r i c e  
- 
w i l l  be equal  t o  t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e .  However, when t h e  
n e t  t r a d e  h i t s  NT1 o r  E  t h e n  t h e  domest ic  p r i c e  
- 
w i l l  d e v i a t e  f r o m  t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  t o  keep t r a d e  from 
g o i n g  below - E. 
( i  i ) Trade --Pr ice 
T h i s  r a n k i n g  o f  p o l i c y  v a r i a b l e s  assumes t h a t  t h e  
p o l i c y m a k e r  ranks  m a i n t a i n i n g  a  p a r t i c u l a r  volume of 
t r a d e  more i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  domest ic  p r i c e .  T h i s  m i g h t  
be t h e  case f o r  example when a  c o u n t r y  t r i e s  t o  keep 
i t s  sha re  o f  t h e  e x p o r t  market. To do t h i s ,  t r a d e  i s  
k e p t  equal  t o  i t s  t a r g e t  by l e t t i n g  t h e  domest ic  
p r i c e  va ry  f rom i t s  t a r g e t .  
As shown i n  F i g u r e  7, when t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  i s  WP, 
t h e n  w i t h o u t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  domest ic  p r i c e  equa ls  WP 
and NT1 w o u l d  be expor ted.  W i th  i n t e r v e n t  i o n ,  
t h e  domes t i c  p r i c e  wou ld  have t o  be r a i s e d  t o  
DP1. 
The p o l  i c y  d i  dgrams f o r  t h i s  p o l  i c y  r a n k i n g  wou ld  be 
as shown i n  F i g u r e  8. 
I PRICE 
NET EXPORTS NT2 NT1  NET IMPORTS 
FIGURE 7: EXCESS DEMAND FUNCTION FOR TRADE - @ PRICE 
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FIGURE 8: TRADE - @ PRICE POLICY RANKING 
- 
Suppose P  = WP and P  = 14*WP and suppose WP f a l l s  l o w  
enough t h a t  P  DP2. I n  o t h e r  words t h e  government 
wou ld  have t o  s e t  t h e  domes t i c  p r i c e  o u t s i d e  t h e  
bounds f o r  p r i c e  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  t r a d e  t a r g e t .  It 
t h e n  l e t s  t h e  q u a n t i t y  t r a d e d  a d j u s t .  
( i  i i ) Stocks - -Pr ice  
T h i s  r a n k i n g  o f  p o l  i c y  v a r i a b l e s  assumes t h a t  t h e  
p u b l i c  s t o c k  t a r g e t  i s  more i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  p r i c e .  
The domes t i c  p r i c e  (DP) w i l l  b e  a l l o w e d  t o  v a r y  from 
i t s  t a r g e t  s o  as t o  keep t h e  s t o c k  l e v e l  a t  i t s  
t a r g e t .  T h i s  m i g h t  be t h e  case  i f  a  c o u n t r y  wanted 
t o  m a i n t a i n  some emergency s t o c k s  o f  food.  
( i v )  P r i c e  - Stocks 
F o r  t h i s  r a n k i n g  o f  p o l  i c y  v a r i a b l e s  t h e  domes t i c  
p o l  i cymaker  i s  assumed t o  have b o t h  a  p r i c e  t a r g e t  
and a  s t o c k  t a r g e t ;  however, t h e  p r i c e  t a r g e t  i s  more 
i m p o r t a n t .  T h e r e f o r e  t h e  p r i c e  t a r g e t  i s  met w h i l e  
t h e  s t o c k s  v a r y  f rom t h e i r  t a r g e t  u n t i l  one o f  t h e  
s t o c k  bounds i s  h i t .  Then t h e  p r i c e  i s  a l l o w e d  t o  
v a r y  f r o m  i t s  t a r g e t .  
I n  t h r e e  d imens ions,  t h e  above r a n k i n g s  can be drawn as i n  
F i g u r e s  9, and 10. F i g u r e  11 shows t h e  d e f a u l t  r a n k i n g  i n  t h e  
c u r r e n t  BLS. 
5.1.3 Examples o f  Pol i c y  S i t u a t i o n s  
The f o l l o w i n g  examples show how t h e  r a n k i n g  and use o f  p o l i c y  
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FIGURE 9: PRICE HAS A NEGATIVE STRONG PRIORITY OVER TRADE 
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FIGURE 10: STOCK HAS A NEGATIVE STRONG PRIORITY OVER PRICE 
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FIGURE 11: PRICE, STOCK AND TRADE POLICY 
( i )  Free Trade 
( i i )  T a r i f f s  
( i  i i )  Impor t  a o t a s  
( i )  Free Trade 
For  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  BLS, each coun t r y  model can 
be  cons idered  as  a  homogeneous excess demand 
f u n c t i o n .  When t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  exchange c a l c u l a t e s  
a  s e t  o f  wo r l d  p r i c e s ,  t h e  coun t r y  model must 
t r a n s l a t e  t h i  s  i n t o  an i n t e r n a l  equ i  1  i b r i  urn, i .e., 
q u a n t i t y  consumed, change i n  s tocks ,  and n e t  t r a d e  . 
The n e t  t r a d e  o f  each good i s  r e q u i r e d  by t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  exchange (F i gu re  12).  Th is  can be 
d e p i c t e d  f rom t h e  po l  i c y  space as shown i n  F i gu re  13. 
I n  t h e  f r e e  t r a d e  case, t h e  o n l y  a1 lowab le  
comb ina t ion  o f  domest ic p r i c e  and n e t  t r a d e  l i e s  on a  
p r i c e  1  i n e  such t h a t  t h e  domest ic p r i c e  i s  equal t o  
t h e  wo r l d  p r i c e  and any q u a n t i t y  may be t raded.  
( i i )  T a r i f f  
The above p o l i c y  can be m o d i f i e d  so t h a t  t h e  home 
c o u n t r y  imposes an ad valorem t a r i f f  ( t )  on impo r t s  
and a  subs idy on expor ts .  
Wi thout  t h e  t a r i f f ,  t h e  excess demand would be 
ED1. With t h e  t a r i f f ,  i t  s h i f t s  t o  ED2. If t h e  
w o r l d  p r i c e  i s  a t  WP1 t hen  t h e  q u a n t i t y  
impor ted  w - i l l  be NT1 and t h e  domest ic p r i c e  i s  
DP1. A1 t e r n a t i v e l y  i f  t h e  wo r l d  p r i c e  i s  
WP2, t h e n  t h e  q u a n t i t y  expor ted  w i  11 be NT2 
and t h e  domest ic  p r i c e  DP2 ( ~ i g u r e  14). 
NET EXPORTS NT  NET IMPORTS 
FIGURE 12: EXCESS DEMAND FUNCTION FOR A FREE TRADE POLICY 
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FIGURE 13: FREE TRADE POLICY RANKING 
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FIGURE 15: POLICY RANKING WITH A TARIFF 
The a l l o w a b l e  comb ina t ions  o f  domes t i c  p r i c e  and n e t  
t r a d e  l i e  on a  l i n e  wh ich  i s  (1 + t)WP and any 
q u a n t i t y  may be  t raded .  
T h i s  does n o t  mean t h a t  t h e  domest ic  p r i c e  i s  h e l d  a t  
a  f i x e d  l e v e l  b u t  r a t h e r  e q u a l s  ( 1  + t)WP ( F i g u r e  
15). 
( i  i i )  Impor t  Quota 
I f  t h e  home c o u n t r y  i n t r o d u c e s  an i m p o r t  quota ,  t h i s  
can be  p i c t u r e d  i n  t h e  excess demand d iagram ( F i g u r e  
16) .  B e f o r e  t h e  quota ,  t h e  excess demand was 
ED2. The i m p o r t  quo ta  e f f e c t i v e l y  p u t s  a  k i n k  
i n  t h e  i m p o r t  s i d e ,  t o  ED2. If t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  
were a t  WP1, t h e  i m p o r t  q u o t a  would n o t  be  
b i n d i n g  and t h e  q u a n t i t y  i m p o r t e d  wou ld  b e  NT1 
and t h e  domes t i c  p r i c e  would be DP1. If, 
however, t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  d e c l i n e d  t o  WP2, t h e n  
t h e  q u a n t i t y  i m p o r t e d  would be  NT2, t h e  maximum 
q u a n t i t y  a1 lowed and t h e  domest ic  p r i c e  be DP2* 
T h i s  can be  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  p o l i c y  space as  shown 
i n  F i g u r e  17. I n  o t h e r  words, t h e  o n l y  a l l o w a b l e  
c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  domes t i c  p r i c e  and q u a n t i t y  t r a d e d  
l i e s  on t h e  l i n e  shown i n  F i g u r e  17. The domes t i c  
p r i c e  w i  11 be  equa l  t o  t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  u n l e s s  t h e  
r e s u l  t i  ng v o l  ume o f  i m p o r t s  woul d  exceed t h e  quota ,  
i .e., t o  l i e  on t h e  d o t t e d  1  i ne .  I n  t h i s  case, t h e  
i m p o r t s  would be  c o n s t r a i n e d  and t h e  domes t i c  p r i c e  
wou ld  r i s e  above th,e w o r l d  p r i c e .  
I 
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FIGURE 16: EXCESS DEMAND FUNCTION WlTH AN IMPORT QUOTA 
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F i g u r e  18 combines F i g u r e s  16 and 17. The d o t t e d  and 
c o n t i n u o u s  1  i n e s  a r e  t h e  p o l  i c y  s e t  ( t h e  a d m i s s i b l e  
s e t  o f  domes t i c  p r i c e  and t r a d e  v a l u e s  g i v e n  a  w o r l d  
p r i c e ) .  T h i s  p o l i c y  s e t  may change as  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  
t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  ( i  .e. as  WP1 d rops  t o  WP2). If t h e  
w o r l d  p r i c e  were a t  WP1 and t h e r e  were n o  p o l i c y  
i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  t h e n  t h e  domest ic  p r i c e  wou ld  be 
WP1 and NT1 Would be t raded .  I f  t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  
were a t  WP2, t h e  domes t i c  p r i c e  wou ld  a l s o  be 
WP2. However, i f  t h e r e  were an i m p o r t  quo ta ,  t h e  
d o m e s t i c  p r i c e  wou ld  be DP2 and NT2 would  be t r a d e d .  
F i g u r e  1 9  p r e s e n t s  t h e  case where t h e r e  i s  an i m p o r t  
q u o t a  and i n  a d d i t i o n  a  domest ic  b u f f e r  s t o c k  agency. 
Suppose t h a t  t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  i s  WP1 t h e n  w i t h o u t  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  NT1 wou ld  be t r a d e d  and t h e  d o m e s t i c  
p r i c e  wou ld  be DP1. Suppose t h a t  t h e  i m p o r t  
q u o t a  wou ld  n o t  a l l o w  more t h a n  NT2 t o  b e  
impor ted .  I n  t h i s  case t h e  domes t i c  p r i c e  wou ld  be 
D P ~  and NT2 would  be impor ted.  
I f  t h e r e  was i n  a d d i t i o n  a  domes t i c  b u f f e r  s t o c k  
agency w h i c h  wanted t o  buy Q u n i t s  o f  p r o d u c t  t h i s  
w o u l d  s h i f t  t h e  ED c u r v e  o u t  t o  ED1. I n  t h i s  
case t h e  domes t i c  p r i c e  wou ld  r i s e  t o  DP3. 
I n  p o l i c y  space, suppose t h e  s t o c k  t a r g e t  W = Q and 
- 
t h e  t r a d e  t a r g e t  was E  = = NT2 and = WP. 
Suppose t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  WP1 so t h a t  a l l  t h e  t a r g e t s  
a r e  met. I f  t h e  w o r l d  marke t  p r i c e  f a l l s  t o  WP1 
t h e n  w i t h o u t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  t h e  q u a n t i t y  i m p o r t e d  wou ld  
be g r e a t e r  t h a n  NT2 so  t h e  n e x t  v a r i a b l e  t o  a d j u s t  
i s  p r i c e ,  t h e  domes t i c  p r i c e  r i s e s  t o  ( i f  one e x i s t s ) .  
A t  P t h e  s t o c k  t a r g e t  can no l o n g e r  be met. 
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FIGURE 19: EXCESS DEMAND FUNCTION WITH IMPORT QUOTA AND STOCKS 
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FIGURE 20: POLICY RANKING: STOCKS - @ PRICE - @ TRADE 
F i g u r e  21 combines F igu res  19 and 20. Suppose t h e  
w o r l d  p r i c e  was a t  WP then  w i t h o u t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  t h e  
n e t  impo r t s  would be l a r g e r  t han  t h e  i m p o r t  quota 
t h e r e f o r e  t h e  p r i c e  r i s e s .  The excess demand s u r f a c e  
i n t e r s e c t s  t h e  a l l o w a b l e  p o l i c y  s e t t i n g s  a t  (NT, P  
W) and these  w i l l  be t h e  va lues f o r  impo r t s ,  domest ic 
p r i c e  and s tocks.  
5.2 S p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  Parameters f o r  t h e  P o l i c y  Ins t ruments  f o r  
Canada 
T h i s  s e c t i o n  desc r i bes  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  and t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
used t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  t a r g e t  and bounds f o r  t h e  p o l i c y  
parameters i n  t h e  BLS. These va lues  a r e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  
o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  exchange (demand and p r i c e  equ l  i br i um)  
module. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e r e  a r e  p o l i c i e s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  supp ly  
module which a r e  e x p l a i n e d  i n  t h e  l a s t  p a r t  o f  t h i s  sec t ion .  
Each o f  t h e  t e n  commodit ies i n  t h e  BLS a r e  covered. 
Where consumer s u b s i d i e s  e x i s t ,  t h e  f a r m - r e t a i l  marg in  ( i  .e, 
d i f f e r e n c e  between raw m a t e r i a l  fa rm and r e t a i l  p r i c e s )  i s  
reduced by t h i s  amount. 
5.2.1 Rice,  o t h e r  food, nonfood a g r i c u l t u r e  and 
nonacir icul  t u r e  ( f r ee  t r a d e  1 
Rice,  o t h e r  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  nonfood a g r i c u l t u r e  and 
nonag r i cu l  t u r e  shou ld  a1 1  be represen ted  w i t h  a  
genera l  " f r e e  t r a d e "  model. 
FIGURE 21: POLICY RANKING AND EXCESS DEMAND FUNCTIONS 
FOR: STOCKS - @ PRICE - @ TRADE 
A 
The t r a d e  t a r g e t  ( E )  i s  s e t  equal t o  1  a s t  y e a r ' s  
n e t  expor ts .  There a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  wide bounds on 
t r a d e  ( E  - and i )  f o r  r i c e ,  t h e  n e t  expo r t s  minimum 
can be s e t  a t  - 5  t imes  l a s t  y e a r ' s  consumption. For  
t h e  o t h e r  two commodit ies ment ioned above, t h e  minium 
n e t  e x p o r t s  ( E )  - can be s e t  equal t o  a  percentage o f  
domest ic  p roduc t ion .  Therefore,  as domest ic  
p r o d u c t i o n  r i s e s ,  t h e  lower  bound on n e t  expo r t s  r i s e s  
( i n  o t h e r  words, t h e  impo r t  quota t i g h t e n s ) .  For  a l l  
o f  these  commodit ies, t h e  n e t  e x p o r t  maximum o r  upper 
bound ( i )  can a l s o  be s e t  as a  f u n c t i o n  o f  domest ic  
p r o d u c t i o n  e s s e n t i a l l y  t o  r ep resen t  non t radab le  
goods. 
The p r i c e  t a r g e t  ( P )  can be s p e c i f i e d  as a  f u n c t i o n  
o f  t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  and t h e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t .  The minimum 
- (P) and maximum (P) can be s e t  equal t o  some p ropor -  
t i o n s  of t h e  t a r g e t .  (For  exammple, min 0.5 x 
P, max 2 x c u r r e n t  d e f a u l t s  f o r  t h e  BLS). The 
p r i c e  t a r g e t  i s  o n l y  re leased  if t h e  t r a d e  bounds a r e  
- 
c o n s t r a i n i n g .  The s tock  l e v e l  t a r g e t s  ( W )  and 
bounds (W - and W) should  be s e t  equal t o  zero,  t he reby  
e f f e c t i v e l y  removing s tock  behav iour  f rom t h e  p o l i c y  
o p t  i ons. 
Beg inn ing  a t  t h e  t a r g e t ,  t h e  q u a n t i t y  t r a d e  i s  a l l owed  
t o  va ry  over  a  wide range. For  any g i ven  w o r l d  p r i c e  
(WP), t h e  domest ic  p r i c e  i s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r l d  
p r i c e  ( f o r  example (1 + t)WP). 
TABLE 5.1 VALUES FOR POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR RICE, OTHER 
FOOD, NONFOOD AGR ICLILTURE, NONAGRICllLTLlRE ( f r e e  




Ta r g e t  
UP pe r 
Bound 
- - 
Stocks - W = O  
- 
W = O  
- 
W = O  
- 
- 
P r i c e  P  = 0.5P 
- P = f(WP,K) P  = 2P 
r i c e  = -5 C t - 1  
- 
- 
Trade E  E  = Et-1  E  = 0.8 prod. 
- 
nonagr = -0.2 prod. 
Other f o o d  = -0.2 prod. 
l ~ h e  a c t u a l  imp lementa t ion  i n  t h e  computer program o f  t h e s e  
p o l i c y  bounds may be s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  t h a n  i n d i c a t e d  here. 
F o r  example s i n c e  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  determined when t h e  exchange 
module i s  e n t e r e d  t r a d e  bounds a r e  implemented as 
consumpt i  1  on bounds. 
5.2.2 Bovine and o v i n e  meats ( t a r i f f  and i m ~ o r t  a u o t a l  
- 
I n  t h i s  s e c t o r  t h e  t r a d e  t a r g e t  (E) can be see a t  
l a s t  y e a r ' s  n e t  e x p o r t s .  h e  upper bo-und o r  
- 
c o n s t r a i n t  on t r a d e  ( E )  i s  f a i r l y  h i g h  and i s  s e t  
equal  t o  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  domest ic  p roduc t ion .  However, 
i n  t h i s  case t h e  minimum n e t  e x p o r t s  ( E )  - maximum n e t  
i m p o r t s )  i s  s e t  f a i r l y  t i g h t  b u t  a l s o  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  
domest ic  p r o d u c t i o n .  h e  i m p o r t  quota f o r  beef i s  
a c t u a l l y  c a l c u l a t e d  - u s i n g  a  c o u n t e r c y c l i c a l  fo rmula .  
The p r i c e  t a r g e t  (P) i s  s p e c i f i e d  as a  f u n c t i o n  o f  
w o r l d  p r i c e  and t h e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t .  h e  minimum and 
- 
maximum bounds (P,P) - a r e  rep resen ted  as . a  p r o p o r t i o n  
o f  t h e  t a r g e t  p r i c e .  Stock t a r g e t s  (W) and bounds 
- 
(W,W) a r e  s e t  equal  b u t  t o  a  smal l  number. 
TABLE 5.2 VALUE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR BOVINE AND 
OVINE MEATS ( t a r i f f  and impo r t  quota)  
Lower Upper 




Stocks - W = W  W = smal l  # W = W 
- . - - 
P r i c e  - P  = 0.5P P = f(WP,K) P  = 2P 
- 
- 
Trade - E = a  + b prod. E  = E t - 1  E  = .5 prod. 
( i m p o r t  quo ta )  
Other meats (pork ,  p o u l t r y  and eggs, f i s h )  
There a r e  severa l  p o s s i b l e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h i s  
sec to r .  The reason f o r  t h e  i n d e c i s i o n  i s  t h e  
d ive rgence  o f  p o l i c i e s  f o r  t h i s  sec to r .  The pork  
s e c t o r  can b a s i c a l l y  be represented i n  t h e  same way as 
bov ine  and o v i n e  meats; however, t h e  p o u l t r y  and eggs 
s e c t o r  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  p roduc t i on  quotas,  fo rmu la  
p r i c i n g  and impo r t  quotas. In  genera l ,  t h e  pork  and 
f i s h  sec to r s  a r e  a l lowed t o  t r a d e  f r e e l y  w i t h  t h e  r e s t  
o f  t h e  wo r l d  whereas t h e  p o u l t r y  and egg s e c t o r s  a re  
v e r y  c o n t r o l  1  ed. 
The proposed s p e c i f i c a t i o n  i s  t h e  same as f o r  bov ine  
and o v i n e  meats, s i n c e  t h e  t r a d e  i n  pork  dominates 
t r a d e  i n  p o u l t r y  and eggs. The t r a d e  t a r g e t  
- 
(E) should  be s e t  equal t o  t h e  t r a d e  l a s t  
- 
year .  The upper bound (E) should  be s e t  r e l a t i v e l y  
c l o s e  t o  t h e  t a r g e t  as a  f u n c t i o n  o f  lagged s tocks  and 
p roduc t ion .  The lagged s tocks  t e rm  a l l o w s  a1 1 o f  l a s t  
y e a r ' s  s t ock  t o  be t raded.  The lower  bound a l s o  can 
be f o rmu la ted  as a  f u n c t i o n  o f  p roduc t ion .  
- 
The p r i c e  t a r g e t  (P)  i s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  w o r l d  p r i c e ,  
t r a d e  d e f i c i t ,  p r i c e  o f  coa rse  g r a i n  l agged  and t h e  
p r i c e  o f  n o n a g r i c u l t u r e  lagged. The l a t t e r  t w o  p r i c e s  
r e p r e s e n t  a  c o s t  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  p r i c i n g  fo rmu la .  
- 
Again, t h e  p r i c e  bounds (P,P) - a r e  equa l  t o  - 
p r o p o r t i o n s  o f  t h e  t a r g e t .  The s t o c k  l e v e l  t a r g e t  W 
and 1  ower bound (W) would be s e t  equa l  t o  z e r o  and t h e  
- 
- 
maximum (W) s e t  a t  a  c a p a c i t y  c o n s t r a i n t  




Ta r g e t  Bound 
S tocks  W = 0  
- 
W = O  W = c a p a c i t y  
- - - - 
P r i c e  P = 0.5P 
- P  = f(WP,K, P = 2P 
c o s t  o f  prod.)  
Trade - E = a  + b  prod.  E = Et-1 E  = Wt-1 + B  
prod.  
D a i r y  
5.2.4 
T h i s  s e c t o r  o f  Canadian Ag r i  c u l  t u r e  i s  1  a r g e l y  
c o n t r o l  l e d  by t h e  Canadian D a i r y  Commi s s i  on (CDC). 
The p o l i c i e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  p r i c e s ,  s t o c k s  and t r a d e  may 
b e  r e l a t i v e l y  w e l l  d e f i n e d ,  b u t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  e a s i l y  
t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  BLS. I n  some 
cases,  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  made by t h e  CDC on an ongo ing  
b a s i s  and one can o n l y  s p e c u l a t e  wh ich  t y p e  o f  s t o c k  
o r  t r a d e  p o l  i c y  would be adopted f o r  any g i v e n  
s i t u a t i o n .  
. 
The t r a d e  t a r g e t  ( E )  can be s e t  a t  l a s t  y e a r ' s  t r a d e .  
The l o w e r  bound (E )  i s  a  cheese i m p o r t  quo ta  and t h e  
- 
- 
upper  bound (E) can be s e t  a t  l a s t  y e a r ' s  s t o c k  1  e v e l  
1  e v e l  p l u s  a  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n .  The p r i c e  
- 
t a r g e t  (P) i s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  p r i c e  o f  c o a r s e  g r a i n  
l a g g e d  and t h e  p r i c e  o f  n o n a g r i c u l t u r e  l a g g e d  t o  
r e p r e s e n t  a  c o s t  o f  p r o d u c t i o n .  The upper  and l o w e r  
- 
bounds ( P  - and P) can be  p r o p o r t i o n s  o f  t h e  t a r g e t .  
- 
The s t o c k  l e v e l  t a r g e t  (W) and l o w e r  bound (W) s h o u l d  be 
- 
- 
s e t  equa l  t o  z e r o  and t h e  upper  bound (W) r e p r e s e n t s  
a  s t o r a g e  c a p a c i t y .  
TABLE 5.4 VALUE OF POLICY INSTRLIMENTS FOR DAIRY 
Lower UP p e r  
Bound Targe t  Bound 
- 
- 
Stocks - W = O  W = 0  W = c a p a c i t y  
o f  p rod. )  
- - 
Trade - E = cheese E  = Et -1 E  = W t - 1  + B  prod.  
quota  
5.2.5 Wheat, c o a r s e  g r a i n  and o i  1  seeds 
T h i s  s e c t o r  i s  1  a r g e l y  c o n t r o l  l e d  by  t h e  Canadian 
Wheat Board, s i n c e  t h e  board  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  
i m p o r t s  and e x p o r t s  o f  most  g r a i n s .  
- 
The t r a d e  t a r g e t  ( E )  can be s e t  a t  1  a s t  y e a r ' s  t rade .  
- 
The upper bound ( E )  i s  a  t o t a l  c a p a c i t y  c o n s t r a i n t  
f o r  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and s to rage  o f  g r a i n  t o  be 
a l l o c a t e d  among t h e  t h r e e  commodities. The lower  bound 
( E )  - f o r  o i l s e e d s  i s  5 t imes  p roduc t ion .  The 1  ower 
bound f o r  b o t h  wheat and coarse g r a i n s  can be a  
f u n c t i o n  of  p roduc t ion .  Th is  i s  used t o  represen t  a  
- 
market  share idea. The p r i c e  t a r g e t  (P) should be 
a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  wo r l d  p r i c e  and t h e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t .  
I f  p r i c e  does vary  ( i  .e., i f  t r a d e  bounds a r e  
c o n s t r a i n i n g )  then  i t  should be a l lowed t o  vary  f rom 
0.2 P t o  5 P. The s tock  t a r g e t s  (W) a r e  p robab ly  
1  a s t  y e a r ' s  s tocks  ( o r  p ipe1 i n e  s u p p l i e s ) .  The 
minimum bounds (W) - a r e  a  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  p roduc t ion .  
The s tock  upper bound (G) i s  a l s o  a  maximum 
s to rage  c o n s t r a i n t  and should be a l l o c a t e d  between t h e  
t h r e e  commodit ies. 
TABLE 5.5 VALUE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR WHEAT, 
COARSE GRAINS, OILSEEOS 
Lower Upper 
Bound Targe t  Bound 
- 
- 
Stocks - W = B prod. W = W t - 1  W = t o t a l  
g r a i n  s t o r a g e  
capac i  tyt/ 
- - - 
- 
P r i  ce - P = 0.2P P = f (WP,K) P = 5*P 
(wheat, coa rse  
g r a i n )  
Trade E = -.2 p r o d  
- 
( c o a r s e  g r a i n s  ) 
- 
E = - 5 p r o d .  E = E t - 1  
- 
- 
E = t o t a l  
( o i  1 seeds ) hand1 i ng  
and t r a n s p o r -  
t a t i o n  
capac i  tyd/ 
%/separa te  c a p a c i t y  1 eve1 s a r e  spec i  f i ed f o r  each 
commodity, w i t h  t h e i r  sum b e i n g  t h e  t o t a l  f o r  t h e  
system. 
6. THE BLS POLICY MODULE 
6.1 Model Speci f i c a t i o n  
Because o f  a  l a c k  o f  d e t a i l e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  s p e c i f y  t h e  
p o l  i c y  parameters f o r  a1 1  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  BLS, f o r  those  
p o l  i c y  i ns t r umen ts  d e f i n e d  above, a  simp1 i f i e d  approach was 
adopted. S ince t h e  t a r g e t  f o r  t r a d e  i s  o n l y  used as a  
s t a r t i n g  va l ue  f o r  t h e  s o l u t i o n  a l g o r i t h m s  and i n  genera l  t h e  
t r a d e  bounds a r e  f a i r l y  wide, t h e  BLS s p e c i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  
p o l i c y  module f o r  Canada w i l l  i n v o l v e  e s s e n t i a l l y  a  s e t  o f  
p r i c e  t r ansm iss i on  equat ions.  'This p o l  i c y  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  
concented on t h e  p r i c e  v a r i a b l e .  Thus, f o r  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
BLS, t r a d e  was a1 lowed t o  move f r e e l y  (bounds were very  w ide)  
and p r i c e  was h e l d  t o  t h e  t a r g e t  desc r i bed  below. 
The approach used f o l l o w s  t h a t  o f  Abbo t t  (1979),  M e i l  ke and 
G r i f f i t h  (1983),  and L a t t i m o r e  and Schuh (1979). Th is  
approach was t o  d e f i n e  and q u a n t i f y  t h e  ma jo r  p o l i c y  
performance v a r i a b l e s  which dec is ion-makers  observe and 
respond t o  by i n t r o d u c i n g  p o l i c i e s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  
wedge between domest ic  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodity p r i c e s .  
Two r a t i o s  were i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
t o  approx imate p o l i c y  r eac t i ons .  The f i r s t  was a  p a r i t y  
r a t i o  between a g r i c u l t u r a l  and nonag r i cu l  t u r a l  sec to rs .  The 
second was a  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  r a t i o .  It was expected t h a t  if 
e i t h e r  o f  t hese  r a t i o s  dec l i ned ,  p o l i c y  makers would mod i f y  
p o l  i c i e s  t o  i nc rease  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r i ces .  
Lagged p r i c e s  were a l s o  used t o  account f o r  t h e  ad justment  
l a g  and p o s s i b l e  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  c rop  y e a r s  r e p o r t i n g  data.  
P o l i c y  makers may t r y  t o  s t a b i l i z e  domest ic  p r i c e s  which a l s o  
may be i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  lagged p r i c e  c o e f f i c i e n t .  
A1 1  p r i c e s  were expressed i n  r e a l  terms, d e f l a t e d  by t h e  
n o n a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r i c e .  T h i s  was a  requ i remen t  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  
homogenei ty c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  model s o l u t i o n  a l g o r i t h m .  A  
Cobb-Doug1 as s p e c i f i c a t i o n  was used t o  simp1 i f y  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and i t  was expected t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
were n o n l i n e a r .  
The genera l  form o f  t h e  e q u a t i o n s  i s  as f o l l o w s :  
where 
A, B, C, D  and E a r e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  t o  be e s t i m a t e d  
Pi i s  t h e  domest ic  p r i c e  o f  t h e  i - t h  commodity 
PWn i s  t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  o f  t h e  n o n a g r i c u l t u r e  commodity 
(used h e r e  as a  d e f l a t o r )  
PWi i s  t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  o f  t h e  i - t h  commodity 
ZA i s  p e r  c a p i t a  GDP f o r  a g r i c u l t u r e  
ZNA i s  p e r  c a p i t a  GDP f o r  n o n a g r i c u l t u r e  
Yi i s p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e i - t h c o m n o d i t y  
Xi i s  d i sappearance  o f  t h e  i - t h  comnodi ty 
e  i s  t h e  exchange r a t e  (Can/US Do1 l a r s )  
S i x  v a r i a t i o n s  o f  e q u a t i o n  ( 5 )  were es t ima ted .  These 
i n c l u d e d  v a r i a t i o n s  on c o n s t r a i n t s  o f  c o e f f i c i e n t s ,  t h r e e  
y e a r  moving averages on p a r i t y  and s e l  f - s u f f i c i e n c y  r a t i o s ,  
and v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  t i m e  p e r i o d  o f  e s t i m a t i o n .  There were 
some da ta  prob lems f o r  c e r t a i n  c o u n t r i e s  f o r  1975-76 as t h i s  
was p r e l i m i n a r y  d a t a  from FAO. There fo re  t h e  models were 
e s t i m a t e d  o v e r  b o t h  1961-74 ( V e r s i o n  7-10) and 1961-76 
(Vers ions  5-6). 
F o r  a1 1  v a r i a t i o n s ,  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  were c o n s t r a i n e d  as  
f o l l o w s :  
F o r  Ve rs ions  6, 8 and 10, t h e r e  was an a d d i t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t  
t h a t  B  + C adds t o  1.0. I n  o t h e r  words t h e  l o n g  r u n  
e l a s t i c i t y  o f  response o f  domes t i c  p r i c e s  t o  w o r l d  p r i c e s  i s  
c o n s t r a i n e d  t o  be 1.0. 
F o r  v e r s i o n s  9 and 10, a  t h r e e  y e a r  mov ing average o f  p a r i t y  
r a t i o  and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  r a t i o  i s  used. The c o n s t r a i n t s  on 
t h e  e s t i m a t e d  c o e f f i c i e n t s  r e f l e c t  t h e  a  p r i o r i  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
o f  a c c e p t a b l e  1  eve1 s  o f  r e s u l  t s .  
F o r  a  s t a b l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on  l a g g e d  p r i c e s  
must  l i e  w i t h i n  t h e  s p e c i f i e d  range.  Accep tab le  c o e f f i c i e n t s  
f o r  w o r l d  p r i c e s  (C) must be p o s i t i v e  and f o r  p a r i t y  (D) and 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  (E) must  be n e g a t i v e .  A1 1  o t h e r  v a l u e s  
r e f l e c t  maximum a c c e p t a b l e  l e v e l s .  The r e s u l t s  o f  v e r s i o n  5 
a r e  shown i n  T a b l e  6.1. 
F o r  wheat, t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on  t h e  w o r l d  m a r k e t  p r i c e  i s  a t  
i t s  l o w e r  c o n s t r a i n t ,  zero .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  Canadian 
domes t i c  wheat p r i c e s  does n o t  f o l l o w  t h e  w o r l d  wheat p r i c e ,  
w h i c h  o b v i o u s l y  i s  i n c o r r e c t .  Coarse g r a i n ,  on  t h e  o t h e r  
hand, has an e x c e s s i v e l y  l a r g e  c o e f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e  w o r l d  
p r i c e  and t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on t h e  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  t e r m  i s  a t  
i t s  l o w e r  c o n s t r a i n t ,  zero.  Bov ine  meat responds t o  a l l  t h e  
terms b u t  a l s o  has a  s t r o n g  response t o  t h e  income p a r i t y  
term. Fo r  d a i r y ,  aga in  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e  i s  
zero. Because o f  t h e  p r i c i n g  fo rmu la  used, t h i s  c o u l d  be 
acceptab le .  Fo r  d a i r y  t h e r e  a r e  a l s o  c o e f f i c i e n t s  on t h e  
income p a r i t y  t e r m  and t h e  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  term. Resu l t s  
f o r  o t h e r  meats as an aggregate show a  response t o  w o r l d  
p r i c e s  and income p a r i t y .  P r o t e i n  feeds have s i g n i f i c a n t  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  o n l y  on t h e  two p r i c e  terms. For nonfood and 
n o n a g r i c u l t u r e  a1 1  t h e  terms a r e  nonzero, b u t  o n l y  t h e  
i n t e r c e p t  i s  s i g n f i c a n t .  
S e l e c t i o n s  f o r  each commodity o f  t hese  p o l i c y  r e a c t i o n  
f u n c t i o n s  f o r  a c t u a l  use i n  t h e  BLS were made f rom t h e  s i x  
v e r s i o n s  o f  equa t i on  ( 4 )  desc r i bed  above. These s e l e c t i o n s  
a r e  shown i n  Table  6.2. The s e l e c t i o n s  were based on R2, 
t values,  a  p r i o r i  expec ta t i ons  and model s i m u l a t i o n  
r e s u l t s .  
For  wheat, i n f l u e n c e  o f  c u r r e n t  w o r l d  p r i c e s  i s  l ow  (0.32), 
b u t  w i t h  a  h i g h  lagged e f f e c t  (0.68). S i m i l a r  r e s u l t s  a r e  
shown f o r  r i c e .  Impact o f  w o r l d  p r i c e s  a r e  h i g h e r  f o r  coarse  
g r a i n ,  beef ,  o t h e r  meats and p r o t e i n  feed. For d a i r y ,  
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  r a t i o  i s  ve r y  impo r tan t ,  b u t  n o t  w o r l d  
p r i c e s .  Fo r  o t h e r  food, w o r l d  p r i c e s  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  and t h e  
lagged p r i c e  a f f e c t  i s  s t rong .  For  non f ood  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  t h e  
lagged  p r i c e  a f f e c t  i s  ve r y  h igh .  
TABLE 6.1 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR POLICY REACTION FUNCTION FOR 
CANADA (1961-76) 
A B C D E DW 
Cornrnod i t y  (T ) ( T )  (T ) ( T )  ( T )  RBAR2 S t a t  
Wheat 
R i c e  
Coarse 









Agr i c .  
See t e x t  f o r  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  c o e f f i c i e n t s .  
TABLE 6.2 SELECTED PRICE POLICY REACTION FUNCTIONS FOR THE BLS: 
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS FOR CANADA 
Wheat R i  ce Coarse Grains Beef Da i ry 
Non Food 
Other  Meats P r o t e i n  Feed Other Food A g r i c u l t u r e  
* S i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from ze ro  a t  t h e  one percen t  l e v e l  o f  
s i g n i f i c a n c e .  
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Summary 
The examinat ion of  t h e  commodity p r i c e  d a t a  showed a  number 
o f  d isc repanc ies  between da ta  from IIASA (FAO) and Canadian 
sources. O f  p a r t i c u l a r  concern was t h e  t i m i n g  o f  t h e  l a r g e  
p r i c e  inc reases  i n  g r a i n s  and o i l  seeds i n  t h e  e a r l y  1970's. 
Never the less,  i n  a l l  cases p r i c e s  f rom Canadian sources were 
h i g h l y  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  IIASA da ta  f o r  domest ic and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e s ,  a1 though t h e  abso lu te  1  eve1 may have 
been d i  f f e r e n t .  
Canadian a g r i c u l t u r e ,  whf l e  r e l a t i v e l y  open t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
markets,  has a  number of  po l  i c y  ins t ruments  a f f e c t i n g  t rade .  
T h i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  impo r tan t  f o r  d a i r y  and o t h e r  meats 
ca tego r i es .  Pol i c y  developments s i n c e  t h e  mid-1970's have 
been 1  a r g e l y  t o  p r o t e c t  producers a g a i n s t  income i ns tab i  1  i t y  
and t o  expand t r a d e  f o r  c o m p e t i t i v e  products .  
The use of  a  s imp le  model (which i nc l uded  o n l y  p r i c e s )  t o  
r e l a t e  domest ic and w o r l d  p r i c e s  was n o t  adequate i n  most 
cases t o  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  t y p e  o f  magnitude o f  t h e  t r a d e  
r e s t r a i n t s  f o r  most Canadian commodities. It i s  apparent 
t h a t  a  l a r g e  number o f  f o r ces - -  economic, p o l i t i c a l  and 
env i ronmenta l - -are i n f l u e n c i n g  these  p r i c e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
The BLS s t r u c t u r e  i n c l  udes exp l  i c i  t po l  i c y  i nstruments f o r  
f i v e  ma jo r  p o l i c y  va r i ab les .  For  Canada, procedures were 
proposed t o  e s t a b l i s h  bounds and t a r g e t s  f o r  each o f  t h e  
t h r e e  commodity p o l  i c y  v a r i b l e s  f o r  t h e  10 commodities. 
However, da ta  1  i m i t a t i o n s  made i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e f i n e  these 
f o r  use i n  t h e  BLS. 
The o p e r a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  component f o r  t h e  BLS was a  p r i c e  
1  i n k a g e  e q u a t i o n  i n c l u d i n g  w o r l d  p r i c e s ,  1  agged p r i c e s ,  a  
p a r i t y  r a t i o  and a  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  r a t i o ,  w i t h  a l l  p r i c e s  
exp ressed  i n  r e a l  te rms.  Va r ious  a1 t e r n a t i v e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
u s i n g  d i f f e r e n t  t i m e  p e r i o d s ,  c o e f f i c i e n t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  and 
mov ing averages o f  t h e  r a t i o s  were e v a l u a t e d  f o r  use i n  t h e  
BLS. 
7.2 Concl u s i o n s  
I n s u f f i c i e n t  a t t e n t i o n  has been g i v e n  by  I IASA t o  t h e  
accu racy  o f  t h e  d a t a .  T h i s  p rob lem may r e t u r n  t o  overshadow 
t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h e  FAP p o l  i c y  
a n a l y s i s .  
C o n s i d e r a b l e  d e t a i l  i s  a v a i l a b l e  on Canadian and o t h e r  
c o u n t r y  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p o l i c i e s ,  wh ich  c o u l d  be i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  
BLS model. Pol  i c y  a p p l i c a t i o n s  a r e  t h e  ma in  " r a i s o n  d ' e t r e "  
f o r  t h e  deve lopment  o f  t h e  FAP model. The p r e s e n t  p o l  i c y  
component o n l y  t a k e s  t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n t o  accoun t  i n  a  v e r y  
g e n e r a l  manner. T h i s  w i l l  g r e a t l y  r e s t r i c t  t h e  q u a l i t y  and 
b r e a d t h  o f  p o l  i c y  a p p l  i c a t i o n s .  
It i s  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  where s u f f i c i e n t  
p o l i c y  d a t a  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  t h a t  t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  be 
i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  d e t a i l e d  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t  i n  t h e  BLS. 
The d e f a u l t  p o l  i c y  b l o c k  s h o u l d  o n l y  b e  used f o r  t h o s e  
c o u n t r i e s  where 1  i m i t e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  on a g r i c u l t u r a l  p o l i c i e s  
e x i s t .  
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